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Terrell Carter, Rachel López & Kempis Songster 
ABSTRACT—Approximately three decades ago, two of us, Terrell Carter and 
Kempis Songster, were sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of 
parole. The U.S. Supreme Court has said that this sentence, effectively an 
order to die in prison, represented a legal determination that we were 
irredeemable. In this Article, with insights from our coauthor and friend, 
human rights scholar Rachel López, we ask: What does it mean for the law 
to judge some human beings as incapable of redemption? Isn’t the capacity 
for change core to the human condition, and shouldn’t that be reflected in the 
law? 
This Article marries human rights law with our lived experience to 
argue that the capacity for redemption is an innate human characteristic. By 
documenting the dehumanizing effect of codified condemnation and the 
struggle for humanity after a person has been found irredeemable in a court 
of law, we seek to show why all humans should have a legal right to 
redemption—a right embedded in the Eighth Amendment through the latent 
concept of human dignity. 
The reading of the Eighth Amendment we call for would require a 
dramatic reimagination of the U.S. criminal legal system into one that 
elevates humanity, not deprives it. One that creates the opportunity for 
healing and human development, not denies it. One that facilitates the human 
capacity for redemption, not forbids it. One, in other words, that recognizes 
that change is always possible. 
Redeeming justice thus requires that legal systems not make unalterable 
decisions about a human being’s capacity for change. At a bare minimum, 
this means that all sentences should be reviewable, with release possible after 
someone redeems herself. No person should be permanently deprived of her 
hope for freedom. 
 
AUTHORS—Terrell Carter is currently on his twenty-ninth year of a death-
by-incarceration prison sentence. He is the author of three published novels 
and a graduate of Villanova University. Rachel López is an Associate 
Professor of Law at the Thomas R. Kline School of Law at Drexel University 
and a Fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Harvard 
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Kennedy School. Kempis Songster served thirty years in prison before being 
resentenced and finally released pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
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sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment. He now lives in 
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& Self-Empowerment Project and the Philadelphia District Attorney’s 
Office. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Do you think that there are any human beings who are not capable of 
redemption?” queried Justice Samuel Alito during oral argument on Election 
Day in November 2020.1 Before the U.S. Supreme Court was the case of 
Brett Jones, who had been sentenced to life in prison without the possibility 
of parole (LWOP) at age fifteen.2 The Court was deciding whether, because 
Jones was a juvenile, his judge was required to find him “permanently 
incorrigible,” in essence incapable of rehabilitation, before imposing that 
sentence on him.3 
 
 1 Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Examines When Juveniles May Be Sentenced to Life Without 
Parole, NPR (Nov. 3, 2020, 5:13 PM) (internal quotation marks omitted), https://www.npr.org/ 
2020/11/03/930892945/supreme-court-examines-when-juveniles-may-be-sentenced-to-life-without-
parole?t=1604835753796 [https://perma.cc/P5GX-BXDH]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021) (No. 18-1259), 
2019 WL 1453516, at *i. The petitioner argued that a finding of permanent incorrigibility was required 
after Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016), which specified that sentencing juvenile 
defendants to LWOP was prohibited “for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes 
reflect permanent incorrigibility.”  
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So, what to make of Justice Alito’s question: Are there some humans 
who are incapable of redemption? Two of us have been told that we were. 
Sentenced to LWOP nearly three decades ago, we were deemed 
irredeemable in a court of law. To use the Supreme Court’s own words, our 
sentence “forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.” 4  It was “an 
irrevocable judgment about [our] value and place in society.”5 We were said 
to have no value to add to and no place in free society. To us, such a sentence 
feels more like death than life and is more aptly called death by incarceration, 
or DBI. 
We adamantly resist such legally codified condemnation. The capacity 
for change is, as we will demonstrate below, core to the human condition, 
and all people, regardless of their age, should have a basic human right to 
pursue personal redemption. It is our conviction that all humans have the 
inner capacity to forgive and be forgiven, to transform and be transformed, 
and that the law should reflect these innate qualities6—that all human beings 
have a right to redemption. 
How do we know this? Because we have changed.7 Our lives expose 
the flaws in these unalterable decisions about the human capacity for change. 
Our paths to redemption crack the veneer of this legally codified 
condemnation. Through a collective process with other incarcerated 
individuals, we formed the Right to Redemption Committee (R2R 
Committee or Committee) and struggled to come to terms with past wrongs, 
finding a path to redemption in a legal system that saw none. The Committee 
discovered that redemption was not something that the state could give or 
take away. Rather, redemption is only realized through personal 
responsibility and growth. While understanding that redemption is deeply 
personal and individualized, we witnessed how the state, as the custodian of 
liberty, had the power either to obstruct or, alternatively, to facilitate, a path 
 
 4 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 473 (2012) (quoting 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 74). 
 5 Graham, 560 U.S. at 74 (emphasis added). 
 6 This understanding of redemption was forged with the insights of Angelys Torres, Sara Curley, and 
Reece McGovern, who worked closely with members of the Right to Redemption Committee as law 
students in the Andy and Gwen Stern Community Lawyering Clinic. 
 7 In this way, we are drawing from the tradition of critical race theory (CRT), which often employs 
“legal storytelling” to offer “counter-accounts of social reality by subversive and subaltern elements of 
the reigning order.” Julia Hernandez, Lawyering Close to Home, 27 CLINICAL L. REV. 131, 135 (2020) 
(first citing RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 178 
(3d ed. 2017); then citing CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, 
at xiii (Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller & Kendall Thomas eds., 1995); and then citing 
Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
2411, 2437–38 (1989)). 
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towards redemption. The law can either restore faith and hope in second 
chances, or it can deny them. 
*          *          * 
After three decades of serving a DBI sentence, I (Kempis Songster, 
known as Ghani to my friends) had my redemption legally recognized by the 
state. After the U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Miller v. Alabama that 
mandatory life sentences for juveniles amount to cruel and unusual 
punishment,8  I was one of 224 people to be resentenced and ultimately 
released in Pennsylvania, the state with the highest number of people 
sentenced as juveniles to life in prison.9 Once deemed so dangerous that I 
could never be free, I am now fully devoted to restorative-justice practices 
and direct Healing Futures, a diversion program for youth created as a 
partnership between the Youth Art & Self-Empowerment Project (YASP) 
and the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office. I have never committed 
another crime. 
I am not alone. A 2020 study conducted by researchers at Montclair 
State University found that only 1.14% of the 174 people released in 
Philadelphia post-Miller have recidivated. 10  Put another way, the state’s 
initial instinct about these offenders’ possibility for redemption was wrong 
nearly 99% of the time. This finding contradicts fixed understandings of the 
dangerousness of “violent offenders” that permeate the law. It also raises 
considerable doubt about the state’s aptitude to make static determinations 
about future dangerousness at the time of sentencing.  
Our coauthor, Terrell Carter, affectionately known as Rell, remains 
behind bars because he was twenty-two years old at the time of his crime.11 
He is a living testament to how flawed the state’s predetermined assessments 
of future worth and redeemability are, but I will let Rell speak for himself. 
 
 8 See 567 U.S. 460, 490 (2012). 
 9 Andrea Finney, Juvenile Lifers Back in Society, Paving Way for Release of Other Young Offenders, 
CBS LOC. 21 NEWS (Jan. 27, 2020), https://local21news.com/news/local/juvenile-lifers-back-in-society-
paving-way-for-release-of-other-young-offenders [https://perma.cc/6AF4-T2U7]. 
 10  TARIKA DAFTARY-KAPUR & TINA ZOTTOLI, MONTCLAIR STATE UNIV., RESENTENCING OF 
JUVENILE LIFERS: THE PHILADELPHIA EXPERIENCE 10 (2020), https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1084&context=justice-studies-facpubs [https://perma.cc/CBN9-CZPE]. 
 11 Neuroscientists have concluded that humans do not reach full social and emotional maturity at that 
age. See Lucy Wallis, Is 25 the New Cut-Off Point for Adulthood?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2013), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-24173194 [https://perma.cc/9P24-P2DE]; cf. M. Brent Donnellan, 
Xiaojia Ge & Ernst Wenk, Cognitive Abilities in Adolescent-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Criminal 
Offenders, 109 J. ABNORMAL PSYCH. 396, 398 (2000) (considering individuals as adolescent-limited 
offenders “if the first arrest occurred after age 17 and commission of criminal offenses stopped by the 
age of 25” because delinquent juveniles “may have had an ‘extended’ adolescence due to incarceration”). 
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*          *          * 
While incarcerated, I have been committed to becoming the best version 
of myself. It hasn’t been easy. I struggled to come to grips with what I had 
done because I was so focused on the unfairness of the judicial process that 
it left no room for me to consider anything or anyone else. It wasn’t until I 
had a conversation with my very good friend, Ghani, that I was finally able 
to realize the impact of my actions. As we talked, Ghani could see that I was 
having difficulty reconciling my accountability with the unfairness I 
experienced in the judicial process, so he said to me, “Rell, imagine you have 
a hearing that will determine whether or not you can get out of prison. What 
you say to a panel of judges that will determine whether or not you should 
be allowed to go home. It’s your time to speak, to convince these judges that 
you deserve a second chance. Right before you utter a word, an elderly 
woman stands up in the courtroom and says to you, ‘But you killed my son.’ 
What would you say to that mother?” 
It was at that moment that I understood. At that moment the selfish 
bubble that I had been living in burst wide open, exposing me to the pain that 
I was responsible for bringing into the world. I realized that I didn’t exist in 
a world populated by just me, that my actions had consequences that 
stretched beyond myself and the moment in which they occurred. From then 
on, I have been committed to becoming the best version of myself, which 
would not have been possible had I not been able to come to grips with my 
past wrongs. 
Since that realization, I have used my time in prison to participate in 
activities towards that end. I just recently graduated from Villanova 
University, and I am currently in pursuit of a master’s degree. I’ve also 
immersed myself in learning the art of creative writing so that I can tell my 
story in hopes that my experiences can be the tools that someone can use to 
save themselves. These learning experiences allowed me to grow, mature, 
and realize my full potential. As the current chairman of the R2R Committee, 
I use my position to mentor young men on the inside, to provide hospice care 
to those with terminal illnesses, and generally to help as many people as 
possible. This has become my purpose—my primary reason for being. Yet, 
as this Article details, because of my determinate life sentence, the state has 
no meaningful mechanism to modify my sentence to reflect the changes I 
have made in my life, simply because I was over the age of eighteen at the 
time of my crime. 
*          *          * 
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We founded the R2R Committee with others in State Correctional 
Institution (SCI) Graterford, a state prison outside Philadelphia, as a vehicle 
for challenging this legal damnation of the human capacity for change.12 
Because the Committee understood this capacity as a core part of humanity, 
belonging not just to the incarcerated but to all members of the human 
species, we adopted a human rights frame. That is not to say that everyone 
will change, but rather that the right to redemption represents the principle 
that if someone does redeem himself, then he should be considered for 
release. 13  The Committee therefore concluded that our LWOP sentences 
violated the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which bars cruel 
and unusual punishment, because they infringed our human right to 
redemption.14 
Although we did not know it at the time of forming the R2R Committee, 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), a court that the U.S. 
Supreme Court has looked to in the past for guidance,15 was simultaneously 
conceptualizing a right strikingly congruent with the R2R Committee’s 
independently conceived right to redemption. Specifically, the ECtHR held 
that “it would be incompatible with . . . human dignity . . . to deprive a 
person of his freedom forcefully without at least providing him with the 
chance to regain that freedom one day.”16 For this reason, in the ECtHR’s 
seminal case, Vinter v. United Kingdom, the court concluded that life 
sentences must allow for the “reducibility of the sentence.” 17  More 
concretely, all life sentences must be regularly reviewed in order to take into 
account “any changes in the life prisoner” and “progress towards 
rehabilitation” so significant that “detention can no longer be justified on 
 
 12 In this way, we view our scholarship as part of an emerging field of movement law scholarship 
aimed at investigating and analyzing the law and legal systems alongside social movements. See Amna 
A. Akbar, Sameer M. Ashar & Jocelyn Simonson, Movement Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. 821, 825 (2021) 
(“In this Article, we [identify] a methodology for working alongside social movements within scholarly 
work. We argue that legal scholars should take seriously the epistemological universe of today’s left 
social movements, their imaginations, experiments, tactics, and strategies for legal and social change. We 
call this methodology movement law. Movement law is not the study of social movements; rather, it is 
investigation and analysis with social movements. Social movements are the partners of movement law 
scholars rather than their subject.”). 
 13 See Judith Lichtenberg, Against Life Without Parole, 11 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 39, 59 (2018). 
 14 We note the right to redemption is likely applicable to other lengthy sentences as well as the death 
penalty but chose to focus our inquiry on LWOP because of Rell’s and Ghani’s lived experience with this 
sentence. 
 15 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (examining analogous cases at the ECtHR, 
such as Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981), when holding that a Texas statute 
making it a crime for two people of the same sex to engage in consensual acts of sodomy in the privacy 
of their own home was unconstitutional).  
 16 Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 317, 347. 
 17 Id. at 349. 
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legitimate penological grounds.”18 The ECtHR found that a life sentence 
amounts to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if the sentence 
holds no possibility of review or prospect of release.19 
In subsequent cases, the ECtHR noted “a trend towards placing more 
emphasis on rehabilitation” in criminal punishment. 20  This global trend 
continues to grow. As we document in this Article, diverse jurisdictions 
across the world are increasingly understanding life sentences that lack any 
prospect of release and possibility of review as an affront to human dignity 
and therefore constituting inhuman and degrading punishment.21 As of 2012, 
LWOP sentences are only legal in thirty-eight of the world’s 193 countries.22 
The Vatican has also removed the life sentence from its criminal code, with 
Pope Francis calling it “a secret death penalty” and urging its abolition.23 
This jurisprudence, reflecting the right to redemption and the broader 
trend towards outlawing unalterable life sentences on the basis of human 
dignity, is consequential in the context of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth 
Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual punishment. Significantly, it 
places a redemptive reading of the Eighth Amendment within reach. The key 
is the link to human dignity. As other legal scholars have underscored, the 
concept of human dignity is latent in the Eighth Amendment. 24  This 
embedded concept is the bedrock on which a redeeming justice could be 
built. After all, understandings of the Eighth Amendment are not fixed in 
time; they draw from “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress 
of a maturing society.”25 In evaluating the evolving standards of decency, the 
 
 18 Id. 
 19 See id. at 350. Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that “[n]o one shall 
be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS Art. 3 (1950). 
 20 Harakchiev v. Bulgaria, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 391, 445. 
 21 See infra Section IV.C. 
 22 See CONNIE DE LA VEGA, AMANDA SOLTER, SOO-RYUN KWON & DANA MARIE ISAAC, CTR. FOR 
L. & GLOB. JUST., UNIV. OF S.F. SCH. L., CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A 
GLOBAL CONTEXT 25 (2012), http://www.antoniocasella.eu/archica/Cruel-And-Unusual_2012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GBE9-G6XG]. 
 23 See Pope Francis, Encyclical Letter, Fratelli Tutti of the Holy Father Francis on Fraternity and 
Social Friendship, HOLY SEE (Oct. 3, 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted), https://www.vatican.va/ 
content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20201003_enciclica-fratelli-tutti.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F4EA-MJ6E]; see also Pope Francis, Address to the Delegates of the International 
Association of Penal Law, HOLY SEE (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.vatican.va/content/ 
francesco/en/speeches/2014/october/documents/papa-francesco_20141023_associazione-internazionale-
diritto-penale.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3FZ-SKAK] (“A life sentence is just a death penalty in disguise.”). 
 24 See, e.g., Meghan J. Ryan, Taking Dignity Seriously: Excavating the Backdrop of the Eighth 
Amendment, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 2129, 2140–42 (noting that the Court has described human dignity as 
“the touchstone of the Amendment’s prohibition”). 
 25 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
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U.S. Supreme Court has looked to international and foreign jurisdictions for 
instruction in the past.26 Consequently, the right to redemption, recognized 
in other jurisdictions outside of the United States, could be read into the 
latent concept of human dignity in the Eighth Amendment, thereby 
intertwining conceptions of human dignity worldwide. In this way, the law 
could be interpreted in a manner that affirms humanity rather than denies it. 
Restoring hope, both in and through the law, is possible. In the current 
moment, when many are questioning the underlying assumptions, 
inequalities, and biases that have driven this country to become a carceral 
state that imprisons 2.3 million people,27 embracing this principle seems 
more urgent than ever. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I memorializes our path to 
redemption, collectively discovered with other members of the R2R 
Committee. It speaks fundamental truths about the dehumanizing effect of 
codified condemnation and the struggle for humanity when the state has 
determined someone to be legally irredeemable. It also articulates the 
Committee’s understanding of the right to redemption and how DBI denies 
this human right. Part II traces the emergence of the redemptive rights in 
human rights law that developed in parallel with the Committee’s 
conceptualization of the right to redemption. It focuses in particular on the 
robust jurisprudence in the ECtHR, which in many ways echoes the R2R 
Committee’s understanding of the right. Part III demonstrates how the 
United States is grossly out of line with these human rights standards. It 
demonstrates this misalignment through a state-by-state analysis, 
highlighting sentencing schemes in which the avenues for review and release 
are particularly capricious, uncertain, and opaque. In total, we have identified 
at least twenty-five jurisdictions in the United States that fail to meet 
international human rights standards. Finally, Part IV sets a path forward for 
redeeming justice in the United States. This last Part charts a way for the 
right to redemption to be incorporated into and reconciled with existing 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, thereby giving substance to the Court’s 
rhetorical evocation of human dignity in Eighth Amendment case law. 
I. THE RIGHT TO REDEMPTION 
Having been deemed irredeemable and condemned to die in prison, we 
joined together with others in SCI Graterford, a state prison outside 
Philadelphia, to develop a concept that would vindicate our humanity and 
 
 26 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–76 (2005). 
 27 Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON POL’Y INST. 
(Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/C665-89C6].  
 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
324 
defy our legally codified condemnation. Behind prison walls, an idea took 
root that would motivate our lives’ mission: all human beings have the innate 
capacity for change and consequently the right to redemption.28 Serving an 
LWOP sentence, or DBI, felt like a daily affront to this right. The R2R 
Committee soon concluded that the state making a one-time, irrevocable 
damnation of our lifetime capacity for change was a violation of our human 
rights, and we reflected this belief when drafting our mission statement, seen 
in Figure 1. 29  Two years later, the ECtHR would come to the same 
conclusion. 
In this Part, written from the perspective of Rell and Ghani, we trace 
the birth of the R2R Committee and the foundational ideas that emerged from 
its members. We describe how the Committee conceptualized redemption 
and its attendant rights. We also document the dehumanizing effect of 
codified condemnation and the struggle for humanity in the face of a legal 
system that told us that we were irredeemable. These personal accounts of 
the U.S. criminal legal system reveal how indefinite confinement can 
needlessly deny opportunities for the individual and communal righting of 
past wrongs.  
 
 28 Other legal scholars have evoked redemption in the criminal law context, but we are the first to 
argue that all human beings have a right to redemption, explicitly adopting a human rights frame. The 
R2R Committee’s articulation of the right to redemption also predates this scholarship. See, e.g., 
Katherine Hunt Federle, The Right to Redemption: Juvenile Dispositions and Sentences, 77 LA. L. REV. 
47, 72–73 (2016) (contending that those sentenced to LWOP as juveniles should have a right to 
redemption); Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 963, 963 (2013) (arguing for “a redemption-focused approach to criminal records”). 
 29  See RIGHT TO REDEMPTION, https://right2redemption.com/ [https://perma.cc/PU2W-KAPN]. 
Throughout this Article, we provide our understanding and characterization of R2R’s policies and 
principles based on our close affiliation with the organization. 
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FIGURE 1: RIGHT TO REDEMPTION MISSION STATEMENT 
 
A. The Formation of the Right to Redemption Committee 
In 2011, a group of dedicated men formed a new committee, the Right 
to Redemption Committee, within Lifers Incorporated (Lifers Inc.) at one of 
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Pennsylvania’s historically largest prisons, Graterford.30 At the time of its 
inception, the morale of the men condemned to die behind Graterford’s forty-
foot walls was at an all-time low. During this period, there was an intense 
sense of urgency because death had become a familiar occurrence. In the 
early days of R2R, we were still relatively young men who were just 
beginning to understand the inevitability of our sentences. At the time, it 
seemed as if every other week one of the condemned would finally succumb, 
his life journey ending in the misery of existing in a life stripped of all hope. 
Time after time, we bore witness as the men we all knew, men whom we had 
grown to love, men who mentored us and watched us with pride as we 
matured into positive men in an extremely negative environment, were 
wheeled out of their prison cells on stretchers, stiff and eyes dim. Prison 
nurses and sometimes correctional officers frantically applied chest 
compressions in a futile attempt to reignite the light in those dim eyes. But 
the spark had dissipated, their life journeys coming to a close, bringing about 
the promise of their court-ordered condemnation. 
There was this unspoken truth that we all shared. We knew that if 
nothing changed in the near future regarding our condition, then we would 
all have to face the bleak reality of dying alone in prison, without ever having 
the opportunity to try to make up for the harm that we caused. We all knew 
that it was only a matter of time before each and every one of us would be 
taking that sightless ride on a penitentiary gurney. This unspoken truth fueled 
the urgency that brought us together—a group of men who made a 
commitment to ourselves, to each other, and to the nearly 4,500 souls 
condemned to die in Pennsylvania’s prisons,31 to do whatever we could to 
help bring about an end to the inhuman practice of sentencing human beings 
to DBI. 
At the time of R2R’s formation, the Graterford chapter of Lifers Inc. as 
described by then-president Mr. Wayne Battle when he recruited us to the 
R2R Committee, was in a state of flux—lost. After year upon year of failing 
to secure parole eligibility, a disease of complacency set in. There was this 
insidious, subconscious loss of hope that slowly eroded the joy of life and 
drained the energy necessary for the monumental struggle of ending LWOP 
prison sentences. We had become lost in the how-to and blind to the fact that 
 
 30 Lifers Inc. is an organization formed by incarcerated people in order to secure parole eligibility 
for those serving mandatory LWOP sentences in Pennsylvania. See LIFERS INC., 
https://www.lifersincpa.org [https://perma.cc/ZBC3-36YP]. Graterford closed in 2018 and was replaced 
by a new facility at the same location. See SCI Phoenix, PA. DEP’T OF CORR., https://www.cor.pa.gov/ 
Facilities/StatePrisons/Pages/Phoenix.aspx [https://perma.cc/82P6-ZLHQ]. 
 31  ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S. KING, NO EXIT: THE EXPANDING USE OF LIFE SENTENCES IN 
AMERICA 8 (2009), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/no-exit-the-expanding-use-of-life-
sentences-in-america [https://perma.cc/4LP6-JT2L]. 
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the means had become the end, and the actual goal of abolishing mandatory 
LWOP became a moving target that was becoming more and more distant. 
In a moment of clarity, Mr. Battle shook off the malaise of failure and 
became determined to get the organization back on track. He believed that 
the best way to do so would be by forming a new committee that would focus 
exclusively on securing parole eligibility for the thousands sentenced to 
mandatory LWOP prison sentences. With Mr. Battle’s newfound 
determination and narrowed focus, the R2R Committee was born. 
Once formed, our group’s first task was to figure out what its core 
values would be. What would be the space from which we would operate? 
Who did we want to be? One of the few things that we knew at that point 
was that we had to take a different approach than the one that had brought 
nothing but failure and death—an approach that for decades had provided no 
relief for the thousands of men, women, and children condemned to spend 
the rest of their lives in prison. 
In the conversations that ensued, the very first thing that we realized 
was the importance of language—how we were existing in a language that 
created a prison within a prison. We realized that language shaped our reality 
and that the first wall that had to be deconstructed was the one language built 
within us, through the words that we used to describe ourselves and our 
condition. Through these months-long, extremely intense conversations, we 
came to recognize the difficulty of condemning someone if you can see your 
humanity reflected in him. We began to see how the terms that we used to 
describe ourselves and our struggle removed us from the ranks of humanity, 
making it virtually impossible for people to see a reflection of their humanity 
when they looked at us. We saw how we became the “other,” not belonging 
to the human family, thereby somehow deserving to be thrown away and 
discarded forever. We saw that if we continued to use others’ definitions of 
who we were, then no matter how far removed we were from the people who 
caused so much pain, no matter how much we transformed, no matter the 
determination that we had to be the best versions of ourselves, no matter the 
certificates, the degrees, and the lives that we affected in positive ways, we 
would always be chained and shackled to the worst moments of our lives. 
We became acutely aware of how labels and their connotations can 
define the entirety of who we are by a tragic moment that only lasted for a 
flash out of a lifetime and, as a result, imprison us more effectively than iron 
bars or stone walls ever could. Our lives in prison were filled with 
stereotypes, classifications, labels, and oversimplifications of individual 
human beings created for convenience, expediency, and even political and 
economic advantage: “criminals,” “superpredators,” and “convicted felons.” 
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These words denied who we were as human beings and left no space for 
alternative narratives. 
We realized that the commoditization, dehumanization, and even 
warehousing of human beings were characteristics of a world where 
individual stories were hidden under blanket indictments. However, we came 
to understand that human behavior is more complex than society’s damning 
labels would have us believe. From this new awareness came a drive to 
undertake the arduous task of redefining ourselves and our struggle. Each of 
us had his own story to tell. However, we needed a story in which we were 
the “heroes,” not the “villains.” This narrative shift helped us to realize our 
full potential and escape judgment on the basis of a partial or imagined 
narrative. 
As a result, we stopped referring to ourselves as “convicts,” “lifers,” 
“prisoners,” “inmates,” or any other self-deprecating label that imprisons us 
within the worst expression of ourselves. We stopped describing our 
condemnation as life without parole. We concluded that there is a beauty 
represented in the word “life” that our damnation would corrupt. So instead, 
we chose a term that more accurately represented our wretched situation: 
death by incarceration. After that very difficult first step of redefinition, our 
journey towards redemption began. 
In order to redeem yourself, you must first acknowledge that you have 
done something wrong. This seemingly simple idea turned out not to be so 
simple at all. Through our dialogue of discovery, we would find that we were 
tainted by an adversarial system of “justice” that made accepting 
responsibility and trying to make amends feel like a liability. 
Like all things American, the criminal legal system is highly 
competitive. It is an “us versus them” system in which you either win or lose. 
The flaw in this way of operating is that winning becomes the sole objective, 
leaving “justice” broken, bloody, and bruised by the wayside. No person or 
thing is immune from this cultural influence. As a group, we had to come to 
grips with how we were also affected by this highly flawed system of 
“justice.” 
Through our ongoing conversations, we discovered that, at the moment 
of arrest, we became players in a game of life or death in which the stakes 
could not be higher. To win meant living, getting our lives back, while to 
lose meant hopelessness and death, because to live a life without hope is to 
live a life with the kind of emptiness that can only be found in a grave. So 
we denied. We imagined narratives that gave us the best chance of winning, 
convinced that, when we entered those hallowed halls of justice, our lies 
disguised as the truth would save us and carry us to victory. The process was 
so highly competitive that there was no space for nuance, regret, 
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reconciliation, or healing. It was either guilt or innocence, death or life. You 
either lost or you won. 
Nothing prepared us for when the lies didn’t work—when the judge 
pronounced with finality that we were guilty, right before condemning us to 
die in prison. Life as we knew it had come to an end. As we grappled with 
the pain of what we had lost, it didn’t take us long to realize that the game 
was rigged, stacked against us, and that we never had a chance at winning. 
Our constitutionally protected right to a fair trial was compromised by racism 
and poverty. 
We realized that there existed within the process a pernicious, deliberate 
indifference to fairness and equality that was so all-consuming that it made 
it hard for us to see ourselves and the parts we played in these human 
tragedies. What we had done became invisible, caught in a game of winning 
and losing. Atonement was not a conscious thought at all. 
Instead, we clung to our claims of innocence and focused on the 
unfairness of the process. We could only see how our court-appointed 
attorneys never visited us before our trials began, how they never performed 
any investigations or interviewed any witnesses, how the assistant district 
attorneys and police officers would withhold and fabricate evidence and 
coerce false testimony and confessions. 
Winning soon became our sole focus. It was our only means of holding 
on to the fragile hope that we would one day have a second chance at life. 
The harm that we caused became lost in the fight for our lives. Blinded by 
this game of winning and losing, we leaned heavily on the walking sticks of 
our denial of guilt, believing that it was the only path that did not end in the 
loss of all hope, despair, and death by incarceration. 
Yet with time, as we walked through this process together as a 
Committee, we developed a greater understanding of the impact that this 
flawed hypercompetitive system of “justice,” this us versus them dynamic, 
had on us. We were able to come to grips with the realization that the 
criminal legal system had embedded within us a selfishness—a sense of 
entitlement—that only allowed us to see how we were wronged. We were so 
consumed by these justified feelings of injustice that we were blinded to the 
wrong we had done. Our dialogue allowed us to see—to realize—that we did 
not live in a world populated only by ourselves and that our actions had 
consequences reaching far beyond what had happened to us. Our 
conversations allowed us to move beyond ourselves and see the pain that we 
were responsible for. It opened up a space within us where we strived to 
make right what we had done wrong and make amends to the communities 
and, if possible, to the families that we had harmed. We realized that this 
conscious decision—this need to make amends—was something uniquely 
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human. But we also realized that to be condemned to die in prison stripped 
us of the ability to exercise this distinctly human characteristic. We saw how 
this condemnation not only blocked the path to redemption but also scorched 
and razed it to the ground. 
As a Committee, we reflected on the tremendous harm we had caused 
to the communities we came from and concluded that we needed to atone—
to make amends—for the harm we caused. We also understood that righting 
the wrongs of our past may be something forever out of our reach. But at the 
same time, we realized that our communities were in desperate need of our 
help, because within our communities were other young men and women 
just like our former selves, whom we had the ability to reach. Atonement for 
us meant trying to save as many of those at-risk lives as we possibly could. 
Yet our condemnation separated us from those communities, both physically 
and mentally, because inherent to a DBI sentence are the beliefs that we can 
never be trusted, that we will never be better than our worst actions, and that 
we must therefore be separated from our communities to keep them safe. But 
having demonstrated that we are not the same and that we are willing to 
atone, to redeem ourselves, how can we do so if we are forever locked into 
the box of the worst expression of ourselves? 
We decided that we wanted to be a group that reminded people of this 
characteristic—this need to atone—that separated us from animals. We 
wanted to remind people that every man, woman, and child has an absolute 
right to redemption and that no other human being or system could take that 
away. So we decided that this idea would shape us and keep us from 
becoming lost in the means. We decided to call ourselves Right to 
Redemption—a constant reminder of the pain for which we were 
responsible, but also a reminder that every one of us belonging to this 
sometimes-loving, sometimes-hateful, sometimes-estranged human family 
has an inherent capacity to try to make amends for that pain.32 We decided 
 
 32 In a recent article, Professor Anna Roberts critiques the use of redemption in legal scholarship 
because, in her view, it implies that those who have been convicted of a crime are sinful. Anna Roberts, 
Convictions as Guilt, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2538 (2020) (“And an argument for redemption or 
rehabilitation seems to assume that one committed a crime and that, in doing so, one sinned or revealed 
that one is sick and thus needs fixing.”). Our understanding of redemption could not be farther from this 
characterization. In forming the R2R Committee, we chose the word redemption not because it was a 
perfect term but because it was the best term in the English language to express our belief that we all 
make mistakes and that we all have the capacity to learn from them. We intentionally characterized the 
right to redemption as a human right because we believe that all human beings (not just those convicted 
of a crime) have an innate capacity for change. 
 Professor Roberts further claims that by evoking redemption, legal scholars “risk obscuring flaws in 
the conviction-production process and reinforcing harmful stereotypes about where guilt resides.” Id. at 
2502. Similarly, Professor Michael Pinard claims that redemption “does not describe, reflect, or otherwise 
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that what we called ourselves should be an embodiment of our struggle to 
restore our natural right to be fully human—a right that was taken away when 
we were condemned to die in prison. 
B. Paths to Redemption 
While our process was inherently and necessarily collective, we 
discovered that the journey to redemption is fundamentally a personal one. 
Redemption itself is not something that can be codified. It cannot be forced 
upon an individual. It must come when someone realizes the pain he is 
responsible for. Otherwise, how can someone right a wrong when there is no 
acknowledgment of the wrong? How can one redeem oneself if there isn’t 
an intent to do so? Redemption is a personal choice, and it arrives at different 
times for different people. 
*          *          * 
Rell describes his relationship with redemption this way: 
 
The idea of redemption has come to define me: it is something I 
embody, it is what I think, what I breathe, and it has become the sustenance 
that fuels me to struggle on as the smothering darkness of condemnation 
snuffs out the light of hope. As the chairman of Right to Redemption, the 
conversations of discovery and growth that I was a part of freed me from the 
absolute confinement of a DBI prison sentence. It has liberated me in the 
sense that I was able to demolish the invisible walls that I had unwittingly 
helped to construct—walls that had imprisoned me within a game that I could 
not win. 
As the walls of self-pity held together by the mortar of my lies crumbled 
around me, I was able to see how I had cocooned myself in this space of an 
ironic reversal of perspectives where I became the “good guy.” Everything 
that represented the state and the people who I had harmed became the “bad 
guys” in this cosmic battle of good versus evil. What I had done, my 
transgression, and the pain I had caused others became like a distant memory, 
clinging to the edges of my consciousness as I fought to overcome the evil 
machinations of the state. 
 
relate to those who have been prosecuted because of their race, poverty, and criminalization. The 
processes of atoning, repairing, and transforming have no application to them.” Michael Pinard, Race 
Decriminalization and Criminal Legal System Reform, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 119, 134 (2020). We 
contend that it is possible to recognize, as we profoundly do, that the criminal legal system is often racist 
and fundamentally flawed, while at the same time to wish that we were not shedders of anyone’s blood. 
We must hold space for this complexity too. 
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The idea of redemption saved me. It saved me from this narrowly 
defined existence of us versus them, of vengeance masquerading as justice. 
The right to redeem oneself has become as precious to me as the right to live 
free, because the idea of redemption has awakened in me this incredible 
sensitivity to a harm that, without my actions, could not exist in the world. It 
has awakened in me this burning desire to right my wrongs and to give back 
to the community that I so selfishly have taken so much from. 
Without the idea of redemption being an intricate part of who I am, I 
would still be locked within cages of self-pity and falsehoods. I would be 
forever blocked from acknowledging the pain I caused, thereby allowing the 
state to masquerade in a guise of justice so that it can then rationalize forever 
denying me, and thousands just like me, the right to exercise that distinct 
human capacity that we all share—the ability to atone. 
*          *          * 
For Ghani, it’s about seeing himself more fully and understanding his 
greater purpose in the world: 
 
For me, redemption became the reclaiming of all the dimensions of my 
humanity, all the nuances that contributed to my commission of an 
irreversible act, so that I can know for myself that I am more than what I was 
in prison for. I have a purpose on this earth that is more than to take another 
human life. I have a responsibility to not be confined to my lowest and 
darkest moment. I have a journey to a destiny beyond condemnation to DBI. 
I have a profound duty to discharge to the universe. For, certainly, the cosmic 
implications of the blood that will forever stain my hands is not lost on me. 
I maintain that I left a tear in the fabric of life that will never be mended—a 
hole in the cosmos that will never be filled. But I am not accountable to the 
system that condemned me. I am accountable to the family I thrust into a 
state of permanent loss, to my own family that I had dishonored, to the 
community of which I had not been a better teenaged member, and to my 
peers and the younger children for whom I had failed as an example. 
Over the years spent in the dark recesses of tombs called prisons, and 
in coffins called cells, I traveled along the walls of my consciousness in 
search of the truth of myself. Torchlights were offered to me by well-
meaning oldheads, and light emanated from books that became windows in 
the walls of my consciousness and helped me to find my way to several 
conclusions. One conclusion was that nothing kills the soul more quickly and 
absolutely than a secret about a murder—and, if the murder is known, the 
denial of it. What if I had gone a month, or six months, or a year, with the 
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secret of what I had done? What would I have had to tell myself, and how 
would I have had to act, in order to make myself appear normal? What would 
I have become the longer I wore that mask? I learned to appreciate having 
gone for only a week before what I had done was discovered. And during 
that week, I felt the strain of having to put on a façade for the people around 
me. Had I spent longer maintaining that façade, what would I have become? 
Whatever innocence I had was gone, never to return, no matter how 
much and how badly I wished it would. It drowned in the blood of my worst 
wrongdoing. But I could and must regain my humanity and moral rectitude. 
That’s what I told myself. No other struggle was more worthwhile. I could 
and must water the seeds that I knew were still in the soil of my soul. And 
those seeds could sprout and blossom into something, someone, worthy of 
being called a community member, citizen, brother, friend, neighbor, 
advocate, husband, and now father. 
*          *          * 
As we have set out above, the path to redemption is a deeply personal 
one. Redemption is not something that the state can give or take away. 
Rather, it can only facilitate or obstruct it. As with other human rights, the 
right to redemption rests with the individual, not the state. The right does not 
cease to exist because the state refuses to recognize it. At the same time, the 
state can play an important role in helping people to exercise this right by 
creating the space, opportunity, and encouragement for them to arrive at 
redemption on their own. Indeed, as we describe in Part II, under human 
rights law, the state has a duty to do so. 
C. The U.S. Criminal Legal System’s Iron Bed 
In our experience, the U.S. criminal legal system has not fulfilled its 
obligation to facilitate the redemption of those within its custody. Rather, it 
was an impediment on our road to redemption. Instead of cultivating 
transformation or encouraging us to make amends, the carceral state locked 
us in the worst expression of ourselves. No avenue was built into the criminal 
legal process for recompense, reconciliation, healing, and hope, which 
families and communities enclosed by all forms of violence so desperately 
need. Below, Ghani fittingly describes the U.S. criminal process as 
Procrustean. 
*          *          * 
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Procrustes was the bandit in the Greek tale of the hero Theseus. 33 
Procrustes would invite travelers to spend the night in his inn, but once they 
checked in, he would force them to lie down on his iron bed, binding them 
with chains. For those who were shorter than the length of the bed, Procrustes 
would stretch them on a rack until they equaled the length of the bed. For 
those who were too tall, Procrustes would cut off their extremities to make 
them fit the bed. In either case, the end result was death. In the same way, 
the U.S. criminal legal system ruthlessly forces everyone into the same mold 
of “criminal,” “superpredator,” “prisoner,” and “inmate.” It treats all of us 
the same without regard for our special circumstances and individual 
characteristics, effectively chaining millions to an iron bed and robbing them 
of the chance of redemption. That iron bed is manifest in our mandatory 
sentencing schemes, particularly mandatory life without parole. 
This perspective is lifted higher by Danielle Sered, founder and director 
of Common Justice and author of the groundbreaking book Until We Reckon: 
Violence, Mass Incarceration, and a Road to Repair.34 According to Sered, 
“In our zero-sum system, complexity is a liability.” 35  Complexity is 
inefficient; it slows down the carceral machinery; it takes resources. The 
system tries to remove the aspects of human beings that make us more than 
empty vessels and refuses to acknowledge our capacity to change and grow 
into responsible and contributing members of the human family. For the sake 
of efficiency, it develops a story of “criminals” and “violent offenders” that 
prevents us from being seen in the world as what all human beings are—
uniquely flawed but also capable of flourishing, loving, and healing. 
For me, Miller v. Alabama, supported by Montgomery v. Louisiana, 
became a crack and fissure in the foundations of the Procrustean bed and 
forced the state to see me as I really am.36 In Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled it unconstitutional to subject adolescents to mandatory LWOP 
sentences.37 The Court mandated that a wider latitude of mitigating factors 
must be considered by sentencing judges who might otherwise condemn a 
 
 33 For more information about the tale of Procrustes, see The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
Procrustes: Greek Mythological Figure, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Procrustes 
[https://perma.cc/9HPB-G4WX]. 
 34  DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON: VIOLENCE, MASS INCARCERATION, AND A ROAD TO 
REPAIR 22 (2019). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733–34 
(2016). In many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, LWOP sentences are mandatory, which means 
that the sentences are automatic for certain crimes without ever taking into account the individual 
circumstances of the defendants. William W. Berry III, Life-with-Hope Sentencing: The Argument for 
Replacing Life-Without-Parole Sentences with Presumptive Life Sentences, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1058, 
1064 (2015). 
 37 567 U.S. at 465. 
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teenager to die in prison,38 thereby introducing complexity into the system. 
According to the Court, this decision reflected “the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”39 The Court reserved 
LWOP for those rare cases when juvenile defendants’ crimes reflect 
“permanent incorrigibility.”40  
In the resentencing of condemned children, it became the job of the 
defense to lift up the complexity of the defendant and her narrative. 
Mitigation experts were called forward to join defense teams.41 Mitigating 
narratives thus came to the fore in the criminal legal process where they had 
previously been left untold. Mitigation reports became an indispensable part 
of the resentencing hearings of people who were sentenced to LWOP for 
crimes committed when they were juveniles.42 These experts came to help 
liberate condemned children from the Procrustean bed by telling the story of 
the individual that was never told or even considered. We reclaimed the 
complexity, the nuance. We told the stories of the hero’s journey. We told 
our stories. 
D. Redeeming the U.S. Criminal Legal System 
In considering how the right to redeem oneself might be incorporated 
into our country’s laws, we have to examine the underlying assumptions of 
the system more broadly and deeply. We must be willing to take a hard look 
at long-held, seldom-questioned beliefs to examine what they really mean 
and if those meanings reflect our moral compositions. 
The law is the codification of rules agreed upon by the community, 
which are used to maintain order in society. It also entails the consequences 
for those who break those agreed-upon rules. The foundation upon which the 
law rests is the concept of justice. A law that exists without justice is simply 
tyranny. 
 
 38 Id. at 489. 
 39 Id. at 469 (citation omitted). 
 40 Id. at 479–80; Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733–34. But cf. Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 
1321–22 (2021) (concluding that a finding of permanent incorrigibility is not required before sentencing 
a juvenile to LWOP). 
 41 Prior to Miller, any testimony by experts about the mitigating circumstances of a juvenile’s youth 
at trial would be immaterial in jurisdictions where LWOP sentences were mandatory. See Miller, 567 U.S. 
at 465, 473 (explaining that mitigating evidence at sentencing was irrelevant because judges did not have 
discretion to alter sentences in light of mitigating evidence in jurisdictions where LWOP prison sentences 
were mandatory, and consequently holding that judicial discretion to transfer a juvenile to an adult court 
was not enough protection to satisfy the Eighth Amendment). 
 42 For example, Ghani’s mitigation report was crucial at his resentencing hearing. See Annie Ruhnke, 
Lauren Fine & Joanna Visser Adjoian, Youth Sent’g & Reentry Project, Kempis Songster Mitigation 
Report and Reentry Plan (July 7, 2017), http://northwesternlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ 
Kempis-Songster-Mitigation-Report-and-Reentry-Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MQ4-9GSK]. 
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What is justice, this idea that we use to ground the laws that govern us? 
What is our motivation for punishing another for a wrong or injury? Looking 
at the laws and structures that exist in our country, a theme emerges: Justice 
is often conflated with vengeance.43 For some, vengeance satisfies feelings 
of helplessness. It mitigates feelings of victimization. To exact vengeance is 
to “empower.” That is the justification for the victim becoming the 
victimizer. But in this world of hurting those who hurt you, there is an ever-
expanding pool of victims drowning in waters of pain. As a society of people 
who pride themselves on using laws founded on principles of justice, it is 
important that we closely examine how we define what justice is and not 
confuse moral rightness and equity with vengeance. This is paramount 
because laws are simply words printed on paper, making them only as good 
as the people who are charged with enforcing them. If the people who 
enforce the law believe that justice and vengeance are synonymous, then the 
outcomes to which we hold them accountable will reflect that. 
What does the law look like when it is soaked in vengeance? It is the 
whispered echo of the Old Testament’s eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth that 
takes on the form of statutes bereft of forgiveness and second chances. It is 
the statute that issues punishments that smother hope and deny any chance 
at redemption.44 It is the code that mandates DBI, condemning human beings 
to die behind towering concrete and razor wire without a second thought. 
These laws keep people locked away forever with the worst expression of 
themselves and do not account for the possibility of transformation with 
time. 
As a society we have become mired in this historical, Old Testament 
conception of punishment. But how does this millennia-old paradigm 
reconcile with the twenty-first-century words of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Graham v. Florida, which state that “[t]o determine whether a punishment 
is cruel and unusual, courts must look beyond historical conceptions to the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society”?45 If punishment is rooted in the ancient soils of an eye for an eye, 
maintaining its conceptual integrity throughout the centuries, what does that 
say about the progression of our society? 
 
 43 Jack Boeglin & Zachary Shapiro, A Theory of Differential Punishment, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 
1528 (2017) (“And, as a number of commentators have suggested, the increasingly influential ‘victims’ 
rights’ movement has been motivated in large part by some victims’ desire to utilize the criminal justice 
system for just such vengeful motives.”). 
 44  Id. (explaining that states that adopt vengeance-based justifications for criminal punishment 
prioritize victims’ desire for revenge over other reasons for lessening the imposition of punishment on 
offenders). 
 45 560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010) (internal quotations omitted). 
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Can law viewed through this prism of vengeance be mature and evolve? 
How can it reflect redemption? We will answer that question by asking 
another: If we satisfy our pain by causing pain to others, thereby creating 
laws inundated with cycles of trauma and providing no opportunity to heal, 
would those laws reflect anything redemptive? Would those laws be just? 
Graham also stressed “the essential principle that, under the Eighth 
Amendment, the State must respect the human attributes even of those who 
have committed serious crimes.”46 Mandatory DBI flies directly in the face 
of this principle because it ignores one of the most distinguishing 
characteristics about human beings—the capacity to atone. 
II. THE HUMAN RIGHT TO REDEMPTION 
At the same time the R2R Committee was developing its conception of 
the right to redemption, other legal systems around the world were 
simultaneously developing juridical concepts strikingly similar to ours. As 
the Committee did, these jurisdictions linked hope to human dignity, 
concluding that all human beings have a fundamental right to hope and that 
the existence of this right forestalls DBI. 
This Part, written with insights from Rachel López, a human rights 
scholar, documents how the R2R Committee’s understandings of redemption 
and its attendant rights align with international human rights law. The 
significance of classifying the right to redemption as a human right means 
that the right belongs to the individual, not the state. The state does not have 
the power to give or take away this right. While there may be instances in 
which the state denies the right, the right itself rests with the individual as 
part of her essence of being human. It is inalienable. 
A. The Legal Right to Redemption 
1. The ECtHR’s Right to Redemption 
At the same time that the R2R Committee was delineating its own 
understanding of the right to redemption, the ECtHR was grappling with 
whether there was a similar right embedded in human rights law. 
Specifically, that court decided a series of cases that examined whether 
“hope” is a vital aspect of the human experience, specifically in the context 
of DBI sentences.47 Like the R2R Committee, the ECtHR understood the 
 
 46 Id. at 59. 
 47  Adriano Martufi, The Paths of Offender Rehabilitation and the European Dimension of 
Punishment: New Challenges for an Old Ideal?, 25(6) MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 672, 676–77 
(2018); see, e.g., Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 317, 358 (Power-Forde, J., 
concurring) (“The judgment recognises, implicitly, that hope is an important and constitutive aspect of 
the human person.”). 
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concept of “hope” as being intertwined with belief in the capacity for 
change.48 At their core, the decisions of the ECtHR affirm our central thesis: 
all human beings have the capacity for change. 
The ECtHR operationalized this belief in its landmark case, Vinter v. 
United Kingdom, which concluded that “all prisoners, including those 
serving life sentences, [must] be offered the possibility of rehabilitation and 
the prospect of release if that rehabilitation is achieved.” 49  Absent the 
possibility of release on the basis of rehabilitation, the court concluded, life 
sentences run afoul of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), which prohibits inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment, much like the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.50 
The court went so far as to characterize as “capricious” sentencing schemes 
that result in people, like the men of the R2R Committee, not “knowing 
whether, at an unspecified future date, a mechanism might be introduced 
which would allow [them], on the basis of that rehabilitation, to be 
considered for release.”51 
Vinter expressly linked such torturous punishment to the impossibility 
of atonement, saying “if [an individual] is incarcerated without any prospect 
of release and without the possibility of having his life sentence reviewed, 
there is the risk that he can never atone for his offence.”52 This holding 
echoes the experiences of the men of the R2R Committee recounted in 
Section I.A, who felt that “if nothing changed in the near future regarding 
our condition [namely, our DBI sentences], then we would all have to face 
the bleak reality of dying alone in prison, without ever having the 
opportunity to try to make up for the harm that we caused.” 
Like the Committee, the Vinter court grounded its decision in respect 
for and protection of human dignity, a concept described as being at the “very 
essence” of the ECHR53 (and which, as we will discuss more in Part IV, also 
underlies the Eighth Amendment). The court affirmed what we already 
know: human beings do not lose their capacity for change, no matter what 
 
 48 Vinter, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 358. 
 49 Id. at 347 (majority opinion). Alternatively, the court also noted that a whole life sentence is “a 
poor guarantee of just and proportionate punishment” because of its variable duration. Id. at 346–47. 
Essentially, the longer a person lives, the more severe his sentence is. Id. at 346. 
 50 Id. at 346, 349–50 (“Article 3 must be interpreted as requiring reducibility of the sentence, in the 
sense of a review which allows the domestic authorities to consider whether any changes in the life 
prisoner are so significant, and such progress towards rehabilitation has been made in the course of the 
sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological 
grounds.”). 
 51 Id. at 350.  
 52 Id. at 346. 
 53  Vinter, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 347; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
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crimes they have committed. As we explained in Section I.A, the “need to 
make amends [is] something uniquely human.”54 It is deeply connected to 
human dignity.55 
Thus, in order to account for change over time, the court concluded that 
punishment should reflect what criminologists call the “progression 
principle,” which means that as an individual progresses through the criminal 
legal system, the objective of his sentence should change over time. 56 
Initially, a sentence might be grounded in retribution, and therefore be more 
restrictive, but at later stages, the emphasis should be on preparation for 
release.57 In other words, at the core of the progression principle is the belief 
that individuals, even those in carceral settings, can change over time. In this 
way, the court, like the R2R Committee, had a very individualized 
conception of rehabilitation, understanding it to be a personal process and 
movement towards change.58 
Going another step further, Vinter effectively held that the 
administration of sentences must reflect this progression of the human person 
over time.59 In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that in order to 
detain someone, there must be a legitimate penological justification, such as 
retribution, deterrence, public protection, or rehabilitation.60 In line with the 
progression principle, the grounds for detention are not static; rather, they 
shift over time. 61  What might have constituted a legitimate ground for 
detention early on may become unjust over time, particularly the longer 
detention goes on.62 Without regular review of the state’s justification for 
someone’s continued detention, these shifts cannot be fully appreciated.63 
For that reason, authorities must periodically review a sentence to assess 
“whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant, and such 
progress towards rehabilitation has been made in the course of the sentence, 
as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate 
penological grounds.”64 The essence of the Vinter decision is the following: 
in light of the evolving reasons for punishment, all sentences must be both 
 
 54 See supra Section I.A. 
 55 See Amanda Ploch, Why Dignity Matters: Dignity and the Right (or Not) to Rehabilitation from 
International and National Perspectives, 44 J. INT’L L. & POL. 887, 900–02 (2012). 
 56 Dickson v. United Kingdom, 2007-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, 112–13, 116. 
 57 Id. at 113. 
 58 See Martufi, supra note 47, at 681. 
 59 Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 317, 349. 
 60 Id. at 346. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 346, 349. 
 63 Id. at 346. 
 64 Id. at 349. 
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reviewable and reducible, both de jure and de facto.65 Sentences should not 
be one-size-fits-all Procrustean beds, as unalterable DBI sentences in the 
United States are. 
The ECtHR’s conceptualization of rehabilitation reflects how the R2R 
Committee described the path to redemption. Just as the R2R Committee did, 
the ECtHR linked rehabilitation to personal responsibility.66 Specifically, the 
court envisioned rehabilitation occurring from “re-socialisation through the 
fostering of personal responsibility” over the course of a prison sentence.67 
Or, as we described in Section I.B, redemption “must come when someone 
realizes the pain he is responsible for.” Since rehabilitation, according to the 
court, is considered personal and individual, the ECtHR does not guarantee 
a right to rehabilitation per se.68 Rather, states have a positive obligation to 
promote rehabilitation, meaning that they must provide those who have 
received life sentences with “a real opportunity to rehabilitate themselves.”69 
States must facilitate redemption, not obstruct it. 
The ECtHR has characterized this duty to promote rehabilitation as “an 
obligation of means, not one of result.”70 In practice, this characterization 
requires states to empower individuals “to the extent possible within the 
constraints of the prison context, to make such progress towards 
rehabilitation that it offers him or her the hope of one day being eligible for 
parole or conditional release.”71 Although not required, the court stated that 
one way to accomplish this would be by setting up and regularly reviewing 
an individualized program that would encourage the individual “to lead a 
responsible and crime-free life.”72 In perhaps its strongest articulation of the 
state’s duties, the ECtHR concluded that the “emphasis on rehabilitation and 
reintegration has become a mandatory factor that the member States need to 
take into account in designing their penal policies.”73 
The ECtHR jurisprudence also reinforces the R2R Committee’s 
conceptual analysis of redemption as a right in that the court framed these 
requirements as bestowing certain rights on those in custody (along with 
corresponding obligations on the state). Specifically, the court held that the 
right to a review entails “an actual assessment” of information relevant to 
 
 65 Id. at 346. 
 66 Martufi, supra note 47, at 680–88. 
 67 Dickson v. United Kingdom, 2007-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, 112. 
 68 Harakchiev v. Bulgaria, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 391, 445. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Murray v. Netherlands, App. No. 10511/10, ¶ 104 (Apr. 26, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
fre?i=001-138893 [https://perma.cc/VGB6-EBVD]. 
 71 Id. ¶ 103. 
 72 Id.  
 73 Khoroshenko v. Russia, 2015-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 329, 373. 
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preestablished criteria, meaning that review must be meaningful and in 
accordance with established law. 74  Moreover, the ECtHR held that 
individuals sentenced to life imprisonment have a right to know “at the outset 
of [their] sentence, what [they] must do to be considered for release and . . . 
when a review of [their] sentence will take place or may be sought.”75 The 
power to exercise this right is born at the moment of sentencing. 76 
Consequently, when the state provides no path to release, the individual has 
the right to contest her sentence at that moment, rather than wait until a later 
stage of her incarceration.77 In contrast, the incarcerated members of the R2R 
Committee still have no idea what they must do in order to be considered for 
release, nor when, if ever, a review of their sentence will take place. They 
have no pathway to exercise their right to redemption. 
2. The Council of Europe 
The Vinter court relied heavily on the standards set by the Council of 
Europe, the body that created the ECtHR to enforce the human rights 
obligations arising from the European Convention on Human Rights.78 The 
Council of Europe first denounced DBI over forty years ago, when it 
commissioned a study that concluded that “it is inhuman to imprison a person 
for life without the hope of release.”79 The following year, the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe went further still, passing a resolution 
urging member states to ensure “long-term sentences are imposed only if 
they are necessary for the protection of society.”80 In simplest terms, lengthy 
sentences should no longer be justifiable by retribution alone. 
 
 74 Murray, App. No. 10511/10, ¶ 100. 
 75 Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 317, 350.  
 76 Id. (“Consequently, where domestic law does not provide any mechanism or possibility for review 
of a whole life sentence, the incompatibility with Article 3 on this ground already arises at the moment 
of the imposition of the whole life sentence and not at a later stage of incarceration.”). 
 77 Id.  
 78 See id. at 347–48 (“Council of Europe instruments . . . also demonstrate, firstly, that commitment 
to rehabilitation is equally applicable to life sentence prisoners; and secondly, that, in the event of their 
rehabilitation, life sentenced prisoners should also enjoy the prospect of conditional release.”). For an 
explanation of the relationship between the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights, 
see A Convention to Protect Your Rights and Liberties, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/ 
human-rights-convention#:~:text=The%20European%20Court%20of%20Human,in%20the%20member 
%20state%20concerned [https://perma.cc/K99T-DGTP]. 
 79 SANDRA FREDMAN, COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 173 (2018) (quoting SUB-COMM. NO. 
XXV OF EUR. COMM. ON CRIME PROBS., THE GENERAL REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF LONG-TERM 
PRISONERS 77 (1975)). 
 80 Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, Resolution (76) 2 On the Treatment of Long-Term Prisoners 
1 (Feb. 17, 1976), https://rm.coe.int/16804f2385 [https://perma.cc/P64W-2YJY]. The Committee of 
Ministers “is the Council’s decision-making body and is made up of the ministers of foreign affairs of 
each member state or their permanent diplomatic representatives in Strasbourg. The Committee of 
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To root out sentences solely based on retribution as soon as practicably 
possible, the resolution also encouraged states to examine sentences “as early 
as possible to determine whether or not a conditional release can be granted,” 
recommending that they be reviewed after eight to fourteen years of 
detention and regularly reviewed thereafter. 81  In addition, in 
Recommendation 2003(22) on conditional release, the Committee of 
Ministers affirmed the need for conditional release to be available for all 
sentences, including life sentences.82 It viewed this guarantee as a way to 
reduce the harmful effects of imprisonment.83 The Committee of Ministers 
further recommended that all individuals should know at the start of their 
sentences either the minimum term after which they will become eligible for 
release and the criteria they would need to satisfy to be granted release, or 
the fixed term of their sentences after which they are entitled to release.84  
In addition to these recommendations, the Committee of Ministers has 
adopted multiple affirmations of its commitment to the rehabilitative ideal 
of punishment, going beyond the review of sentences and outlining what 
prisons that embrace the rehabilitative ideal should aspire to do. Specifically, 
in 2003, ten years prior to Vinter, it passed two recommendations that laid 
out a blueprint for prisons that hardly resemble the places where we resided 
for decades in the United States. First, Recommendation 2003(23) on the 
management of life and other long-term sentences advised that officials 
should strive to, among other things, “counteract the damaging effects of life 
and long-term imprisonment” and “increase and improve the possibilities for 
[those serving these sentences] to be successfully resettled in society and to 
lead . . . law-abiding li[ves] following their release.”85 
 
Ministers decides Council of Europe policy and approves its budget and programme of activities.” For 
more information, see The Council of Europe in Brief, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/ 
about-us/structure [https://perma.cc/G6KJ-TGKF]. 
 81 Council of Eur., supra note 80, at 2. 
 82  Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation Rec(2003)22 of the Committee of 
Ministers to Member States on Conditional Release (Parole) (Sept. 24, 2003), https://rm.coe.int/ 
16800ccb5d [https://perma.cc/3PV6-LK5Z]. The Committee’s Recommendation defined conditional 
release as the early release under individualized post-release conditions and requiring more than the 
possibility of an amnesty or pardon. Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85  Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation Rec(2003)23 of the Committee of 
Ministers on the Management by Prison Administrations of Life Sentence and Other Long-Term 
Prisoners, (Oct. 9, 2003), https://www.ochrance.cz/fileadmin/user_upload/ochrana_osob/Umluvy/ 
vezenstvi/R_2003_23_management_of_life_sentence_and_long-term_prisoners.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
9JBG-55WS].  
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Second, in carrying out these aims, the Committee of Ministers 
recommended that states abide by a set of principles, which further reinforce 
the teachings of the R2R Committee, including the following: 
• The individualization principle: “Consideration should be 
given to the diversity of personal characteristics to be found 
among life sentence and long-term prisoners and account taken 
of them to make individual plans for the implementation of the 
sentence . . . .”  
• The normalization principle: “Prison life should be arranged so 
as to approximate as closely as possible to the realities of life 
in the community . . . .” 
• The responsibility principle: “Prisoners should be given 
opportunities to exercise personal responsibility in daily prison 
life . . . .” 
• The progression principle: “Individual planning for the 
management of the prisoner’s life or long-term sentence should 
aim at securing progressive movement through the prison 
system . . . .”86 
Notably, the ECtHR echoed the above objectives and two of these principles, 
the individualization and progression principles, when coming to its decision 
in Vinter.87 
In line with the insights of the R2R Committee, adopting these 
principles would infuse the U.S. criminal legal system with complexity and 
hold space for individual circumstances. In the words of the R2R Committee, 
prison would not be a Procrustean bed that treats everyone the same. Instead, 
the plans for each person’s sentence would be individualized to best facilitate 
that person’s path to personal redemption. Yet, these aspirations could not 
be further from the experiences of the R2R members in U.S. custody. Still, 
they are instructive because they provide a roadmap for how the right to 
redemption could be incorporated more broadly into U.S. correctional 
institutions, should we more sincerely adhere to the rehabilitative ideal. 
B. The U.S. Commitment to the Rehabilitative Ideal 
The United States has already committed to the rehabilitative ideal of 
criminal punishment, as a general principle, through the international human 
rights instruments that it has signed and ratified. Specifically, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which is 
 
 86 Id. app. at 3–5, 8. 
 87  Vinter v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 66069/09, 130/10, and 3896/10, ¶ 61 (July 9, 2013), 
https://echr.coe.int/documents/reports_recueil_2013-iii.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DDS-HA6Z]. The excerpt 
published in print did not contain this paragraph, so we have cited the complete online version. 
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binding on the United States, guarantees respect for detained individuals and 
ensures their humane, restorative treatment as follows.88 First, Article 10(1) 
provides that “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with 
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.”89 
Second, Article 10(3) provides that “[t]he penitentiary system shall comprise 
treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation 
and social rehabilitation.”90 General Comment No. 21 on Article 10 by the 
U.N. Human Rights Committee, the treaty body that monitors the 
implementation of the ICCPR, further clarified that “[n]o penitentiary 
system should be only retributory; it should essentially seek the reformation 
and social rehabilitation of the prisoner.”91 
In addition to this guidance on Article 10, in General Comment No. 35 
on Article 9 of ICCPR, which protects the right to liberty and security of 
person, the U.N. Human Rights Committee noted that “[c]onsideration for 
parole [and] other forms of early release must be in accordance with the 
law.”92  This meant, the Human Rights Committee specified, that release 
cannot be denied on arbitrary grounds, and that granting early release should 
be predicated on the individual’s rehabilitation and whether the individual 
poses any threat to public safety.93 
The U.N. Human Rights Committee has also dealt with individual 
complaints regarding the legality of life sentences. For example, in 
Blessington v. Australia, the committee found that sentencing two 
adolescents to life imprisonment violated the ICCPR.94 Although this case 
was related to juvenile life sentences, the committee made several 
observations about life sentences more broadly. Like the ECtHR in Vinter, 
the committee specified that human rights law requires that there must be 
more than just a theoretical possibility of review and release for those serving 
 
 88  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR]. Despite these binding obligations, there are numerous obstacles to their 
enforcement. See generally David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-
Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129 (1999); Louis Henkin, U.S. 
Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341 (1995).  
 89 ICCPR, supra note 88, art. 10(1). 
 90 Id. art. 10(3). 
 91 U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., ICCPR, General Comment No. 21 on art. 10, ¶ 10 (Apr. 10, 1992).  
For more information about the purpose and function of the U.N. Human Rights Committee, see 
Introduction of the Committee, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIntro.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/M8S5-4UTU].  
 92 U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., ICCPR, General Comment No. 35 on art. 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35, 
¶ 20 (Dec. 16, 2014). 
 93 Id. ¶¶ 20–21. 
 94  Communication No. 1968/2010, United Nations Human Rights Committee [U.N. Hum. Rts. 
Comm.], ¶¶ 7.12, 8 (Nov. 3, 2014). 
116:315 (2021) Redeeming Justice 
345 
life sentences.95 Rather, the review procedure must allow for a thorough 
evaluation of the detained person’s progress towards rehabilitation and the 
state’s justification of his continued detention.96 Echoing Article 10(3) of 
ICCPR, the committee affirmed that no penitentiary system should be strictly 
retributory, and that it should essentially seek the prisoner’s reformation and 
social rehabilitation.97 
III. DBI IS A VIOLATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHT TO REDEMPTION 
Out of line with its commitment to the rehabilitative ideal under 
international human rights law, the United States has taken a decidedly 
retributivist approach to criminal punishment. The U.S. criminal legal 
system regularly makes everlasting judgments that leave little to no room for 
reconsideration. Once someone is deemed irredeemable, the legal machinery 
is set in motion, and it is nearly impossible to change its course. This Part 
explains what drives that machinery, state by state. Using the jurisprudence 
outlining the human right to redemption described above as its frame, this 
Part demonstrates how, in the majority of jurisdictions in the United States, 
a life sentence truly does mean death by incarceration, no matter how 
someone evolves over time. 
A. DBI Under the Eighth Amendment 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s own descriptions of LWOP illustrate why 
the United States’ conception of LWOP is out of line with human rights 
principles, particularly the rehabilitative ideal described in Part II. 98  The 
perpetual condemnation and hopelessness of DBI sentences, which we 
describe in Part I, is not happenstance; it is sanctified in legal doctrine.99 
As a matter of law, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, LWOP 
sentences eschew the rehabilitative ideal protected and promoted by human 
rights law. By the Supreme Court’s own admission, LWOP denies hope 
 
 95 Id. ¶ 7.7. 
 96 Id. ¶ 7.8. 
 97 Id. 
 98 For a comprehensive review of the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence related to LWOP, see 
Nadia Bernaz, Life Imprisonment and the Prohibition of Inhuman Punishments in International Human 
Rights Law: Moving the Agenda Forward, 35 HUM. RTS. Q. 470, 470–80 (2013). 
 99 Alice Ristroph, Hope, Imprisonment, and the Constitution, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 75, 76 (“Hope, 
or its denial, distinguishes LWOP from other prison sentences—not irrevocability, and not any necessary 
difference in the actual length of incarceration.”). Furthermore, at the federal level, the U.S. Congress has 
expressly acknowledged that “imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and 
rehabilitation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582; see also Lichtenberg, supra note 13, at 48 n.42. 
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eternally.100 In Graham, the Court characterized LWOP as “depriv[ing] the 
convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration,” and 
held such sentences were cruel and unusual for juveniles who committed 
nonhomicide offenses.101 Such infinite deprivation is permissible for others, 
because, in the Court’s mind, these sentences reflect “an irrevocable 
judgment about [an offender’s] value and place in society.”102 In essence, a 
decision about a person’s worth has been stamped and sealed by the state 
without any further need for reconsideration. 
By design, LWOP sentences are not meant to facilitate rehabilitation. 
The U.S. Supreme Court said as much, concluding in Graham and reiterating 
in Miller that an LWOP sentence “forswears altogether the rehabilitative 
ideal.”103 With rehabilitation off the table, the state’s responsibility to these 
individuals is limited to feeding, housing, and providing limited healthcare 
to them, devoid of the individualization and regular assessments necessitated 
by human rights law.104 
Following that line of reasoning, the Court in Miller concluded that the 
Eighth Amendment “forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison 
without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders” because of the difficulty 
of distinguishing between “transient immaturity” and “irreparable 
corruption” in people of that age.105 In Jones v. Mississippi, a case decided 
by the U.S. Supreme Court last Term, the Court was asked to decide whether 
this language is tantamount to a permanent-incorrigibility rule, as some 
states have adopted in the wake of Miller. Namely, the issue considered by 
the Court was “[w]hether the Eighth Amendment requires the sentencing 
authority to make a finding that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before 
imposing a sentence of life without parole.”106 Although the Court ultimately 
concluded that such a finding was too difficult for courts to make and thus 
not required by the U.S. Constitution, it did not preclude states from adopting 
their own more rigorous requirements, including their own permanent-
 
 100 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010) (“Life in prison without the possibility of parole gives 
no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no hope.”); see 
also Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989) (noting that an LWOP sentence “means denial of 
hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the 
future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will remain in prison for the rest of 
his days”). 
 101 560 U.S. at 69–70; see also Ristroph, supra note 99, at 76–77. 
 102 Graham, 560 U.S. at 74. 
 103 Id.; Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 473 (2012) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 74). 
 104 Berry, supra note 36, at 1057. 
 105 567 U.S. at 479–80. 
 106 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at i. 
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incorrigibility rules.107 But should a state decide to require a sentencer to find 
someone permanently incorrigible before imposing a DBI sentence, such a 
ruling, like DBI, would be fundamentally at odds with the rehabilitative ideal 
enshrined in the ICCPR, to which the United States is bound, and contrary 
to the right to redemption, which is grounded on the principle that no human 
being is irredeemable. Rather, we believe that all sentences should take into 
account the human capacity for change and be amendable based on personal 
redemption.  
Because LWOP fails to account for human evolution over time, we 
believe that it is tantamount to DBI. The Court’s characterization of LWOP 
affirms our understanding that it is akin to a death sentence. While the Court 
had previously put the death penalty in a category of its own, proclaiming 
that “death is different”108 from other types of punishment, more recently, it 
has drawn parallels between LWOP and death sentences, pointing out that 
LWOP sentences “share some characteristics with death sentences that are 
shared by no other sentences.” 109  Specifically, under the law, LWOP 
sentences—like death sentences—represent an irrevocable determination 
that the condemned lack any ability to redeem themselves.110 In the plurality 
opinion in Graham, Justice Anthony Kennedy was not persuaded that the 
possibility of executive clemency mitigated “the harshness of the sentence,” 
because the possibility was so remote.111 
B. DBI in the United States 
Furthermore, unlike much of the rest of world (as we will detail further 
in Part IV), the United States has made a decisive turn towards life sentences, 
with the number of people serving life sentences more than quadrupling 
since 1984.112 As of 2016, there were nearly 162,000 people serving a life 
sentence—amounting to one in every nine people in prison.113 Almost a third 
(over 50,000) are serving LWOP sentences, leaving no possibility of 
 
 107 Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1315, 1318 (2021). 
 108 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986).  
 109 Graham v. Miller, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010). 
 110 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 474–75. 
 111 560 U.S. at 70. 
 112  NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, SENT’G PROJECT, DELAYING A SECOND CHANCE: THE DECLINING 
PROSPECTS FOR PAROLE ON LIFE SENTENCES 3 (2017), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/ 
delaying-second-chance-declining-prospects-parole-life-sentences/ [https://perma.cc/MPM6-PQCX]. 
 113 ASHLEY NELLIS, SENT’G PROJECT, STILL LIFE: AMERICA’S INCREASING USE OF LIFE AND LONG-
TERM SENTENCES 5 (2017), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/still-life-americas-
increasing-use-life-long-term-sentences/#III.%20Life%20by%20the%20Numbers%20 [https://perma. 
cc/4LBG-NHKJ]. 
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release.114 This statistic represents a sharp increase from the past—in 1992, 
there were only 12,000 people serving LWOP sentences in the United 
States.115 
The dramatic rise of life sentences can be attributed to three factors: 
(1) the abolition of parole and embrace of truth-in-sentencing and three-
strikes laws; (2) the increase in mandatory sentences, particularly under 
“habitual offender” laws; and (3) the use of LWOP as the alternative to the 
death penalty.116 The turn to life imprisonment also follows a broader shift in 
the United States from a focus on rehabilitation to one bent on retribution 
and incapacitation during the crime waves of the 1970s and 1980s.117 
The vast majority of people serving LWOP sentences are concentrated 
in a few states; Florida (16.7%), Pennsylvania (10.1%), California (9.6%), 
Louisiana (9.1%), and the federal system (7.2%) account for just over half 
(52.7%) of the nationwide LWOP population.118 “In Delaware, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania more than 10 percent of the state prison 
population is serving a life sentence with no chance for parole.”119 In ten 
states—Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Pennsylvania, 
South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin—all life sentences exclude the 
possibility of parole.120 In all but one state—Alaska121—LWOP is a possible 
sentence, making DBI a possibility in nearly all fifty states in the United 
States. Unlike the death penalty, which has high reversal rates, reversal of 
LWOP sentences are rare, if not impossible, occurrences.122 Consequently, 
in most jurisdictions in the United States, executive clemency is often the 
only path to escaping DBI for those serving LWOP sentences.123 
 
 114 Id. at 9. 
 115 Berry, supra note 36, at 1059. 
 116 Id. at 1059, 1064. 
 117 Id. at 1059. 
 118 NELLIS, supra note 113, at 9. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 34 n.12. In Arizona, the legislature technically abolished parole in 1993; however, Arizona 
courts still regularly sentenced people to life with a chance of parole. In 2018, Arizona passed a law that 
would provide for parole for those sentenced to life with parole through the clemency process. Michael 
Kiefer, Governor Signs Bill Reinstating Chance of Parole in Some Murder Cases, AZCENTRAL.COM (May 
1, 2018, 7:00 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-investigations/2018/05/01/ 
governor-signs-bill-reinstating-chance-parole-some-murder-cases/571147002/ [https://perma.cc/6UF7-
VRPN]. 
 121 But see Daniel Nichanian, Reformers Target Life Imprisonment and Sentences of Life Without 
Parole, APPEAL (Feb. 28, 2019), https://theappeal.org/politicalreport/reformers-target-life-
imprisonment-and-sentences-of-life-without-parole/ [https://perma.cc/A28Y-76N8] (noting that 
Alaska’s ninety-nine-year sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP). 
 122 See Berry, supra note 36, at 1057 & n.35. 
 123 See ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 15:1 (“After exhaustion of judicial remedies, 
executive clemency remains the only avenue of sentence review.”). 
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Clemency can take many forms, but commutations, and in some states 
pardons, are the only avenues to permanent release for someone serving 
LWOP.124 Pardons absolve convicted persons of guilt and relieve all or some 
of the legal disabilities arising from the pardoned conviction, often restoring 
rights, such as the right to vote, the ability to hold public office, and the right 
to bear arms. 125  Pardons are typically considered an act of mercy or 
forgiveness by the executive branch.126 In the many states, however, in order 
to apply for a pardon, the applicant must have completed his sentence, 
thereby rendering this form of clemency a nonstarter for those currently 
incarcerated in those states.127 This leaves commutation, which results in the 
reduction of a judicially imposed sentence, as the only possible avenue of 
release for those serving LWOP in many states.128 
C. DBI Infringes on the Human Right to Redemption 
Yet, clemency in most (if not all) jurisdictions in the United States does 
not satisfy the requirements laid out in the case law of the ECtHR, which is 
considered persuasive authority by the U.S. Supreme Court and holds 
particular significance in Eight Amendment cases.129 As described in Part II, 
one of the most central aspects of the right to redemption is that there must 
be a possibility of review and a path to release based on an individual’s 
rehabilitation. As will be detailed in Section III.D, the clemency processes 
in many U.S. states substantially lack tangible opportunities for review and 
release. 
While governments are afforded a “margin of appreciation” in 
designing the mechanism for review, the ECtHR has specified that for the 
 
 124 See, e.g., Weldon v. State, 800 P.2d 513, 514 (Wyo. 1990) (highlighting that because good-time 
credit does not apply to life incarceration in Wyoming, only the executive’s commutation power can 
release an offender under such a sentence before her natural death). Clemency can take the form of a 
pardon, commutation, remission, or reprieve. Remission involves the forgiveness of court-imposed fines 
or fees. Reprieve is only a temporary suspension of sentence. See CAMPBELL, supra note 123, § 15.1.  
 125 CAMPBELL, supra note 123, § 15:2. 
 126 See, e.g., Mason v. State, 103 So. 2d 337, 341 (Ala. Ct. App. 1956) (“A pardon cannot wipe out 
the historical fact of the conviction . . . it involves forgiveness, and not forgetfulness.”); R.J.L. v. State, 
887 So. 2d 1268, 1281 (Fla. 2004) (“A pardon is the equivalent of forgiveness for a crime, it does not 
declare the pardoned individual innocent of the crime.”); State v. Blanchard, 100 S.W.3d 226, 231 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. 2002) (“A pardon involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness and it does not wipe the slate 
clean.” (quoting State v. Skinner, 632 A.2d 82, 84 (Del. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re 
Sang Man Shin, 206 P.3d 91, 91 (Nev. 2009) (stating that “a pardon is an act of forgiveness”); Andrews 
v. Gardiner, 121 N.E. 341, 343 (N.Y. 1918) (describing a pardon as an act of “grace and mercy”). 
 127  See 50-State Comparison: Pardon Policy & Practice, RESTORATION OF RTS. PROJECT, 
https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/50-state-comparisoncharacteristics-of-pardon-
authorities-2 [https://perma.cc/YK26-L4UU]. 
 128 See CAMPBELL, supra note 123, § 15:1. 
 129 See infra Part IV. 
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review to comport with human rights law, certain minimum standards must 
be met.130 To start with, the review must allow for consideration of “any 
changes in the life prisoner and progress towards his or her rehabilitation 
[that] are of such significance that continued detention is no longer justified 
on legitimate penological grounds.”131 As a general rule, this review “must 
be based on rules having a sufficient degree of clarity and certainty” and 
release based on “objective, pre-established criteria.”132 In Vinter, the ECtHR 
also noted that international and comparative law support “the institution of 
a dedicated mechanism guaranteeing a review no later than twenty-five years 
after the imposition of a life sentence, with further periodic reviews 
thereafter.”133 Simply put, review mechanisms must be regular, predictable, 
and certain.134 In addition, even when a review mechanism is in place, a 
scheme must allow for the actual reduction of sentences; in other words, 
when someone has no realistic opportunity for release, her punishment is 
inhuman and degrading under Article 3 of the ECHR.135 Thus, in assessing 
reducibility, the ECtHR has found that mechanisms resulting in no or only 
very few releases are suspect. 136  In the words of the R2R Committee, 
mechanisms that afford no possibility of actual release amount to death by 
incarceration. 
In Hutchinson v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR specifically addressed 
under what circumstances executive clemency guaranteed enough process 
and a sufficient possibility of release to comply with these human rights 
standards. Examining the United Kingdom’s clemency process, the 
Hutchinson court determined that review of life sentences by the executive 
branch and release under “exceptional circumstances” is not a per se 
violation of Article 3.137 In assessing why the United Kingdom’s clemency 
process did not run afoul of Article 3, the court examined four factors: (1) the 
 
 130 Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 317, 349. 
 131 Murray v. Netherlands, App. No. 10511/10, ¶ 100 (Apr. 26, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
fre?i=001-138893 [https://perma.cc/VGB6-EBVD]. 
 132 Id. 
 133 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 350. 
 134 Id. at 350–51. 
 135 See id. at 346. 
 136 Murray, App. No. 10511/10, ¶ 100 (“Finally, in assessing whether the life sentence is reducible 
de facto it may be of relevance to take account of statistical information on prior use of the review 
mechanism in question, including the number of persons having been granted a pardon.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 137 App. No. 57592/08, ¶¶ 49–50, 55 (Jan. 17, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170347 
[https://perma.cc/TZ2Z-PX4U]. Professor William Berry III has previously argued that LWOP violates 
the human rights standards concretized in Vinter. See Berry, supra note 36, at 1073. However, since 
Hutchinson has concluded that release through executive review processes like clemency can provide 
sufficient possibility of review and release, Professor Berry’s claim requires more scrutiny and nuance. 
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nature of review, (2) the scope of review, (3) the criteria and conditions for 
review, and (4) the time frame of review.138 
First, in assessing the nature of review, the Hutchinson court concluded 
that “the executive nature of a review is not in itself contrary to the 
requirements of Article 3.”139 This conclusion was based on the margin of 
appreciation allotted to states in designing their mechanisms for review.140 
At the same time, the court in Hutchinson placed great importance on the 
fact that all executive reviews were subject to judicial review and such 
reviews had to be in compliance with Article 3 so that the executive branch’s 
discretion was not unfettered.141 
Second, with regard to the scope of review, the ECtHR in Hutchinson 
reiterated that allowing release only on “compassionate grounds” for those 
with terminal conditions would be insufficient.142 As the court underscored 
in Vinter (which also examined the United Kingdom’s clemency scheme), 
criminal law schemes must also permit actual reduction of a sentence in light 
of rehabilitation.143 The ECtHR, however, noted that the subsequent case law 
in the United Kingdom had clarified that the “exceptional circumstances” 
warranting release under the U.K. scheme included “exceptional progress 
towards rehabilitation,” so it was not out of line with Article 3 of the 
ECHR.144 
Third, when examining whether the criteria and conditions for review 
are sufficient under Article 3, the ECtHR clarified that “[t]he relevant 
question is whether those serving life sentences in the domestic system can 
know what they must do to be considered for release, and under what 
conditions the review takes place.”145 Although the court noted that variation 
is permitted and a high degree of precision is not required to comply with 
human rights law, a review scheme must have “a degree of specificity or 
precision as to the criteria and conditions attaching to sentence review, in 
keeping with the general requirement of legal certainty.”146 In its analysis, 
 
 138 Hutchinson, App. No. 57592/08, ¶¶ 46–69. 
 139 Id. ¶ 50. 
 140 Id. ¶ 45. 
 141 Id. ¶¶ 46–53. 
 142 Id. ¶¶ 55–56. 
 143 Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 317, 349 (“Article 3 must be interpreted as 
requiring reducibility of the sentence, in the sense of a review which allows the domestic authorities to 
consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant, and such progress towards 
rehabilitation has been made in the course of the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no 
longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds.”). 
 144 Hutchinson, App. No. 57592/08, ¶¶ 55, 57. 
 145 Id. ¶ 58 (citation omitted). 
 146 Id. ¶ 59. 
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the Hutchinson court recalled past cases in which the national scheme fell 
short of this threshold, citing the following features: (1) absence of a legal 
obligation for the executive to give reasons for its decisions;147 (2) “lack of 
publicly-available policy statements”;148 (3) “the complete lack of formal and 
informal safeguards”; 149  and (4) the “absence of a sentence review 
mechanism operating on the basis of objective, pre-established criteria.”150 
With regard to the U.K. system of review under scrutiny in Hutchinson, 
the court specified that its determination that the criteria and conditions for 
review met the Article 3 requirements hinged on two considerations. First, 
the ECtHR was persuaded in light of recent case law that, going forward, the 
U.K. scheme would be guided by the human rights standards laid out by the 
ECtHR. 151  Second, since the executive branch was required to provide 
justifications for its decisions and such decisions were reviewable by the 
judiciary, the ECtHR believed that the criteria for release would be further 
fleshed out in the future.152 
In Hutchinson, the court also reiterated its holding in past decisions that 
if individual reasons for grants or denials are not given, the state must ensure 
transparency through other means.153 For example, the court recounted how, 
in Harakchiev and Tolumov, Bulgaria had achieved this by establishing a 
clemency commission, which had to consider international human rights 
law, in addition to other practices that made its operations less opaque.154 
These practices included “the publication of the criteria that guide [the 
clemency commission] in the examination of clemency requests, the reasons 
for its recommendations to the Vice-President to exercise the power of 
clemency in individual cases, and relevant statistical information.” 155  In 
addition, the executive order that established the clemency process could be 
challenged in a court of law.156 The court considered these safeguards enough 
to ensure “the consistent and transparent exercise of presidential powers.”157 
In contrast, the ECtHR criticized the previous administration under 
President Georgi Parvanov, which governed Bulgaria from 2002 to 2012, for 
 
 147 Id. (citing Magyar v. Hungary, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 449, 460). 
 148 Id. (citing Harakchiev v. Bulgaria, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 391, 444). 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Trabelsi v. Belgium, 2014-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 257, 
334). 
 151 Id. ¶ 63. 
 152 Id. ¶ 64. 
 153 Id. ¶ 61. 
 154 Id. (citing Harakchiev v. Bulgaria, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 391, 412–16). 
 155 Harakchiev, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 391 at 443. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
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being “quite opaque.” 158  This administration did not make any policy 
statements about the clemency process available to the public or provide any 
reasons whatsoever for individual clemency decisions.159 The ECtHR found 
that this “complete lack of formal or even informal safeguards,” coupled with 
the absence of cases resulting in actual release, meant that the petitioner’s 
sentence was de facto irreducible, and therefore in violation of Article 3.160 
Finally, with regard to the fourth factor considered, the time frame for 
review of life sentences, the ECtHR stated that there is no fixed time frame 
for review but reiterated Vinter’s finding that human rights law and 
comparative law support a review “no later than twenty-five years after the 
imposition of a life sentence, with further periodic reviews thereafter.”161 
The ECtHR has already found that the U.S. federal review scheme does 
not comply with the standards of Article 3 articulated in its jurisprudence. In 
Trabelsi v. Belgium, the court examined whether Belgium had violated the 
prohibition on cruel and inhumane treatment when it extradited an individual 
to the United States who could possibly be subjected to LWOP. 162  The 
ECtHR recognized that under the U.S. scheme, release would be possible for 
Nizar Trabelsi under certain circumstances.163 Namely, his sentence could 
theoretically be reduced (1) if he provided substantial assistance in the 
investigation or prosecution of someone else, (2) for compelling 
humanitarian reasons, (3) through commutation of his sentence, or (4) via 
presidential pardon.164 Noting that all these procedures were “very general 
and vague,” however, the court concluded that none of these mechanisms 
provided a “prospect of release” sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 
Article 3.165 More precisely, the court held so because no review mechanism 
existed under the U.S. federal scheme that required authorities to assess, 
based on “objective, pre-established criteria,” whether someone had 
“changed and progressed to such an extent that continued detention [could] 
no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds.” 166  While not 
expressly articulated, reading these cases together, the court seems most 
concerned with schemes that place too much discretion in the hands of the 
executive branch and therefore could easily be subject to abuse. 
 
 158 Id. at 444.  
 159 Id. at 410–11, 444.  
 160 Id. at 444.  
 161  Hutchinson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 57592/08, ¶¶ 68–69 (Jan. 17, 2017), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170347 [https://perma.cc/TZ2Z-PX4U]. 
 162 2014-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 257, 307. 
 163 Id. at 333.  
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. at 333–34.  
 166 Id. 
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D. State-by-State Analysis of Clemency 
In light of this jurisprudence and the fact that the majority of people 
serving LWOP sentences in the United States serve them in state correctional 
facilities, we conducted a state-by-state analysis of each state’s clemency 
process to see which states fail to provide either a prospect of release or 
possibility of review under human rights law.  
As a starting point, however, we note that nearly every jurisdiction in 
the United States is suspect under the human rights standards articulated by 
the ECtHR. As explained in Section III.C, although review of sentences by 
the executive branch is not a per se violation of Article 3, the executive’s 
decisions cannot be unfettered.167 Indeed, one of the central reasons that the 
ECtHR found that the United Kingdom’s clemency scheme was in 
compliance with human rights standards was that all executive reviews were 
subject to judicial review.168 This feature is not present in U.S. clemency 
processes. Rather, at the state and federal levels, the executive branch has 
near-unfettered discretion to grant or deny clemency, without any oversight 
by the other branches.169 Unless clemency decisions run afoul of the U.S. 
Constitution, they are generally not subject to judicial or legislative review.170 
As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, “pardon and commutation decisions have 
not traditionally been the business of courts.”171 In addition, access to the 
pardon and commutation process is considered a privilege, not a right.172 
Consequently, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that those serving life 
sentences have no due process right to obtain the reasons that state pardon 
 
 167  Hutchinson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 57592/08, ¶ 50 (Jan. 17, 2017), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170347 [https://perma.cc/TZ2Z-PX4U]; see also supra note 137 
(referencing Professor Berry’s argument that needs more nuanced consideration in light of Hutchinson).  
 168 Hutchinson, App. No. 57592/08, ¶ 46–53. 
 169  See, e.g., Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 276 (1998) (“[P]ardon and 
commutation decisions have not traditionally been the business of courts; as such, they are rarely, if ever, 
appropriate subjects for judicial review.” (citations omitted)); Bundy v. State, 497 So.2d 1209, 1211 (Fla. 
1986) (reflecting the traditional hands-off policy of the judiciary towards executive prerogatives of 
clemency); Carroll v. Raney, 953 S.W.2d 657, 660–61 (Tenn. 1997) (noting that the Governor has 
constitutional authority to commute a sentence for sexual assault to “22 years to life” despite the relevant 
statute’s precluding indeterminate sentencing); McLaughlin v. Bronson, 537 A.2d 1004, 1006–07 (Conn. 
1988) (holding that because the pardon power vests in the legislature it could establish a court of pardons 
from which there is no right to judicial review); see also Jing Cao, Commuting Life Without Parole 
Sentences: The Need for Reason and Justice over Politics 60–62 (2015) (S.J.D. dissertation, Fordham 
Law School), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=sjd [https:// 
perma.cc/KDD7-XS9W] (describing clemency as “a standardless process” that is likely to cause 
confusion and undermine fairness in sentencing).  
 170 Cao, supra note 169, at 60. 
 171 Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981). 
 172 See CAMPBELL, supra note 123, § 15:1. 
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boards denied their requests for commutation, 173  a factor frequently 
considered by the ECtHR. Thus, in order to accord with the human rights 
standards laid out above, states must provide sufficient safeguards and 
ensure transparency through other means.174 As will be detailed below, these 
additional safeguards are generally not present in U.S. clemency processes. 
Adding further to these human rights concerns, clemency decisions in 
the United States tend to be very political.175 The American Bar Association 
(ABA) has described clemency decisions as “often perceived [by the 
executive branch] (rightly or wrongly) as political ‘hot potatoes’ that can be 
used against them if the public is not supportive.”176 The ABA also warned 
that “politics and public opinion will almost always come into play as this 
critical decision is made.”177 For that reason, the ABA advises applicants “to 
remember that local politics, history, demographics, culture, and ethos are 
always at play when a plea for clemency is being considered.”178 This added 
layer of ambiguity raises concerns about whether clemency in general falls 
short of the guarantees to a certain and predictable process detailed in ECtHR 
jurisprudence.179 
In addition to these general concerns about clemency in all jurisdictions 
in the United States, we also examined the clemency processes in each of the 
fifty states. To determine whether these jurisdictions provided a sufficient 
“possibility of review,” we examined the following standards laid out in 
 
 173 Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 466–67. 
 174  See Hutchinson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 57592/08, ¶ 61 (Jan. 17, 2017), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170347 [https://perma.cc/TZ2Z-PX4U]. 
 175 See Rachel Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing Clemency, 21 FED. SENT’G. 
REV. 153, 153–55 (2009); see also Rachel Leingang, Ducey Record on Pardons, Commutations Not 
Forgiving, AZ CAPITOL TIMES (Mar. 9, 2018 ), https://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2018/03/09/arizona-
doug-ducey-pardons-commutations-not-forgiving/ [https://perma.cc/QF6K-9LEA] (“The political 
implications of granting pardons, and especially commutations, can’t be ignored, and they exist regardless 
of party affiliation, said Donna Hamm, the director of Middle Ground Prison Reform. Politicians are 
always gauging which way the wind blows and trying to avoid angering the electorate, especially if 
they’re planning for future offices, Hamm said. That’s why most governors or presidents have pardoned 
a bunch of people on their way out the door, she said.”); Dafna Linzer, In Mississippi, Identities of Pardon 
Applicants Must Be Public, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 12, 2012, 4:23 PM), https://www.propublica.org/ 
article/in-mississippi-identities-of-pardon-applicants-must-be-public [https://perma.cc/P79K-ZG46] 
(documenting the political nature of and lack of transparency in clemency processes at both the federal 
and state levels). 
 176 Memorandum from the Am. Bar Ass’n Capital Clemancy Res. Initiative, North Carolina Capital 
Clemency Information 7 (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.capitalclemencey.org/file/nc_clemency_memo-
02_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8AP-YSDM]. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 See Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 317, 351; see also Murray v. Netherlands, 
App. No. 10511/10, ¶ 100 (Apr. 26, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-138893 [https://perma.cc/ 
VGB6-EBVD]. 
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Hutchinson: (1) whether the executive branch’s decision-making in the 
clemency process is not unfettered (e.g., are its decisions subject to judicial 
review?) (nature of review); (2) whether criminal law schemes permit release 
in light of rehabilitation (scope of review); (3) whether those serving LWOP 
know what they must do to be released (e.g., are there preestablished criteria 
for release known at the time of sentencing? or, alternatively, does the 
executive branch provide individualized reasons for its decisions?) (criteria 
and conditions of release); and (4) whether there is a preestablished time 
frame for review, not later than twenty-five years after sentencing, and there 
are periodic reviews thereafter (time frame of review). In addition, to 
determine whether there is a sufficient “prospect of release” in these states, 
we also examined whether clemency provided a realistic opportunity for 
release as required by Vinter. 180  As specified in Murray, mechanisms 
resulting in no or few releases are suspect in this regard.181 Based on publicly 
available information, as well as the applicable laws and policy statements 
on clemency, we determined that there are at least twenty-five jurisdictions 
in the United States that contravene these human rights standards.182 
As catalogued below, four states provided no path to release whatsoever 
for those sentenced to LWOP, while four others excluded rehabilitation as 
grounds for release. In nine states, a grant of clemency for those serving 
LWOP was so rare that it was practically impossible to obtain. In five other 
states, the clemency process was so opaque that those seeking clemency 
could not possibly know what they must do to secure release. In 
Pennsylvania and Georgia, someone’s prospect for review and release varied 
wildly depending on who held the governor’s office. Finally, in Missouri and 
Tennessee, sentences could only be reviewed after an individual had served 
at least twenty years, the maximum time frame for review recommended by 
the ECtHR. 
The following Sections detail the states’ deficient procedures, noting 
parenthetically which ECtHR standard each group of states offends. 
 
 180 Vinter, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 346. 
 181 Murray, App. No. 10511/10, ¶ 100 (“Finally, in assessing whether the life sentence is reducible 
de facto it may be of relevance to take account of statistical information on prior use of the review 
mechanism in question, including the number of persons having been granted a pardon.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 182 These jurisdictions include Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, and the federal jurisdiction. A chart with a state-by-state analysis of clemency is on file with 
the journal. 
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1. States with No Prospect of Release (Prospect of Release) 
First, a number of states provide no path to release for those sentenced 
to life behind bars, in direct contravention of the human rights standards laid 
out by the ECtHR in Vinter and Hutchinson.183 Nevada is one such state. 
There, the state Board of Pardons Commissioners is prohibited by law from 
commuting an LWOP sentence to one that would allow for parole.184 Those 
serving LWOP in Nevada are also ineligible for a pardon because they have 
not completed their sentences, an eligibility requirement in that state.185 In 
Maine, a state where all life sentences lack the possibility of parole, those 
serving life sentences are categorically ineligible for either a pardon or a 
commutation. 186  This bar can only be waived in exceptional cases. 187 
Similarly, in Kansas, the Governor cannot commute an LWOP sentence.188 
It is unclear whether the Governor is also prohibited from pardoning 
someone with such a sentence.189 In any event, pardons are extremely rare, 
meant only to correct “a miscarriage of justice,” and not based on a person’s 
individual rehabilitation as required by Vinter.190 
Likewise, in Alabama, someone who is serving a life sentence that was 
commuted from a death sentence will never be eligible for parole.191 Such a 
person will also never be able to apply for a pardon unless based on a claim 
of innocence. 192  As a further barrier to all those serving life sentences, 
pursuant to the Alabama constitution, commutation and reprieves are only 
 
 183 Some states fall into multiple categories, but we chose to include them in the category where the 
violation is most apparent and egregious.  
 184 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.085 (2020). 
 185 See NEV. BD. OF PARDONS, CRITERIA AND APPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS: COMMUNITY CASES 2 
(2019), http://pardons.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/pardonsnvgov/content/About/CriteriaAndApplication 
Instructions.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2HS-385W]. 
 186 See Susan Gagnon, Executive Clemency - Pardons and Commutations, ME. DEP’T OF CORR., 
https://www.maine.gov/corrections/adult-community-corrections/pardon-board [https://perma.cc/J852-
TSXU]. 
 187 Id. 
 188 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3705(b) (2021). 
 189 State v. Page, 57 P. 514, 516 (Kan. 1899) (“The effect of a pardon is to release from confinement; 
to restore to the status of citizenship, and to the enjoyment of civil rights.”). But see Clemency, KAN. 
DEP’T OF CORR. (July 9, 2020, 3:20 PM), http://www.doc.ks.gov/prb/clemency [https://perma.cc/MJ8S-
YRJ2] (“[A] pardon does not erase the conviction from the record, remove responsibility for the crime, 
nor can it be the basis for a negative response to the question: ‘Have you ever been convicted of a 
crime?’”). 
 190 See KAN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 189. For an overview of the pardon process in Kansas and 
the infrequency of pardon grants, see Kansas Restoration of Rights & Record Relief, RESTORATION  
OF RTS. PROJECT, https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/kansas-restoration-of-rights-
pardon-expungement-sealing [https://perma.cc/TZA3-NQAK]. 
 191 ALA. CODE § 15-22-27(b), (d) (2021). 
 192 Id. § 15-22-27(a), (d). 
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available to those with death sentences.193 No other authority in Alabama has 
the power to commute sentences, and the executive’s clemency decisions are 
not subject to judicial review.194 Consequently, in these states, regardless of 
the changes that a person makes in her life and her strides in taking 
responsibility for her actions, she will always be condemned to die in prison. 
2. States with No Prospect of Release Based on Rehabilitation 
(Scope of Review) 
In other states, those serving LWOP sentences might be able to secure 
release through the clemency process, but not on the basis of their 
rehabilitation, as human rights law requires. In Oklahoma, for instance, those 
sentenced to LWOP cannot apply for pardon and can only apply for 
commutation if arguing that the punishment was unjust or excessive, not on 
the basis of rehabilitation. 195  Likewise, in Vermont, someone who is 
currently incarcerated can apply only for a pardon, the sole clemency 
mechanism in that state, “in very unusual circumstances where there is 
independent evidence of a gross miscarriage of justice not reviewable 
through the courts.”196 There is no mechanism that allows for release on the 
basis of rehabilitation in that state either. 
In Louisiana, the state with the highest number of people serving 
LWOP (almost one in three people in Louisiana prisons) and where all life 
sentences lack the possibility of parole, release on the basis of rehabilitation 
is very unlikely, if not impossible.197 First, those serving LWOP sentences in 
 
 193 The Alabama constitution provides that “[t]he governor shall have power to grant reprieves and 
commutations to persons under sentence of death.” ALA. CONST. art. V, § 124, amend. 38. 
 194 See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 105 So. 2d 66, 70 (Ala. 1958 ) (“If any clemency is to be extended to 
the appellant, it must come from executive action.”); Scott v. State, 22 So. 2d 529, 531 (Ala. 1945) 
(observing that courts are “without authority in criminal cases to reduce the punishment fixed by the 
jury”); Liddell v. State, 251 So. 2d 601, 606 (Ala. 1971) (observing that “only the Governor has the power 
to grant reprieves and commutations to persons under sentence of death . . . . therefore, a court has no 
power to . . . commute a death sentence imposed by a jury”). 
 195  See OKLA. PARDON & PAROLE BD., PARDON AND PAROLE BOARD FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS ABOUT COMMUTATIONS 1 (2019), https://www.ok.gov/ppb/documents/FAQs%20 
Commutations.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ET5-B3W6] (“The purpose of a commutation is to correct an unjust 
or excessive sentence in relation to the range of punishment for the crimes of conviction. A commutation 
is not intended to serve as an early release mechanism.”); OKLA. PARDON & PAROLE BD., PARDON AND 
PAROLE BOARD FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT PARDONS 1 (2019), https://www.ok.gov/ppb/ 
documents/FAQs%20Pardons.pdf [https://perma.cc/JCR7-24TP]. 
 196 VERMONT GOVERNOR’S GUIDELINES FOR PARDON CONSIDERATION 1, https://governor.vermont. 
gov/sites/scott/files/documents/pardon%20application.FINAL%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK6H-
FXUJ]; Vermont, CRIM. JUST. POL’Y FOUND., https://www.cjpf.org/clemency-vt [https://perma.cc/ 
8AMU-YLKP]. 
 197 Lea Skene, Louisiana’s Life Without Parole Sentencing the Nation’s Highest — and Some Say 
That Should Change, ADVOCATE (Dec. 7, 2019), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/ 
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Louisiana are ineligible to apply for a pardon.198  Second, in order to be 
eligible for commutation, someone must demonstrate, among other things, 
that he “possess[es] a marketable job skill, either through previous 
employment history or through successful completion of vocational training 
while incarcerated.”199 Consequently, rehabilitation alone is not enough. This 
is compounded by how rare commutations are in the state in general. From 
2008 to 2016, then-Governor Bobby Jindal only commuted the LWOP 
sentences of three people, one of whom was his butler.200 
In New Mexico, the current Executive Clemency Guidelines specify 
that a commutation “will normally be considered only in cases of unusual 
meritorious service.” 201  The guidelines offer the following examples of 
“unusual meritorious service”: (1) saving the life of an inmate or prison 
employee; (2) helping to stop an insurrection which threatens the 
administration’s control of an institution; and (3) risking serious bodily harm 
in attempting to secure the release of a hostage. 202  An application for a 
commutation must be accompanied by a supervising authority certifying the 
validity of the claim of “unusual meritorious service.” 203  Incarcerated 
individuals are also ineligible for a pardon.204 Thankfully, at least in 2016, 
only one person was serving LWOP in New Mexico.205 On the whole, the 
above-mentioned states are thus out of line with human rights standards, 
because they offer no prospect of release based on rehabilitation grounds 
alone. 
 
article_f6309822-17ac-11ea-8750-f7d212aa28f8.html [https://perma.cc/R52V-ETG5]; Elizabeth Crisp 
& David Mitchell, See the List: Jindal Grants Clemency to Personal Butler -- a Convicted Killer -- Plus 
20 Other People, ADVOCATE (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/politics/ 
article_fac55ac5-4692-5dc5-bff7-8ca12b75947f.html [https://perma.cc/9SS4-YGPG]. 
 198  See Application for Pardon Consideration, LA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR., 
https://doc.louisiana.gov/imprisoned-person-programs-resources/pardons-parole/application-for-pardon 
-consideration/ [https://perma.cc/BHQ8-JFST]. 
 199 LA. PARDON BD., COMMUTATION INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS, https://s32082.pcdn.co/wp-
content/uploads/2019/08/application.for_.commutation.of_.sentence.pdf [https://perma.cc/WCA4-
LD5J]. 
 200 See Lea Skene & Sam Karlin, Will Gov. John Bel Edwards Ramp Up Use of Clemency Power as 
Part of Criminal Justice Reform Efforts?, ADVOCATE (Feb. 1, 2020, 3:45 PM), 
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_9769c546-4440-11ea-a045-87b5ee818f05.html 
[https://perma.cc/L6L4-5C2X]. 
 201  STATE OF N.M., EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY GUIDELINES, https://www.governor.state.nm.us/wp-
content/uploads/2019/05/Executive-Clemency-Guidelines_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/HPY4-QFF7]. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id.  
 205 NELLIS, supra note 113, at 10. 
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3. States with Opaque and Irregular Clemency Processes (Criteria 
and Conditions for Release) 
In some states, the clemency process is so opaque that it is difficult, if 
not impossible, for those seeking clemency to know what they must do to 
secure release. As set out above, this, too, runs afoul of the human rights 
standards laid out above. For instance, while those serving LWOP sentences 
in Maryland are technically eligible to apply for a commutation, the process 
for applying is completely opaque and utterly confusing.206 Additionally, a 
pardon is out of the question, because all people who are currently 
incarcerated are ineligible.207 
In Florida, clemency is considered to be “an act of mercy.”208 In other 
words, clemency is not something that an individual can work towards 
throughout her sentence. Rather, it depends on the subjective compassion of 
the executive branch. This understanding of clemency is reflected in the 
rules, which are opaque, unpredictable, and uncertain. First, according to the 
rules governing the process, “[t]he Governor has the unfettered discretion to 
deny clemency at any time, for any reason.”209 However, those serving all 
life sentences are categorially ineligible for a pardon. 210  This leaves 
commutation as the only path to release for those sentenced to life 
imprisonment. 211  It is also unclear how many people are granted 
commutations because these statistics are not publicly available.212 Further 
contributing to this opacity, all records and documents gathered during the 
clemency process are considered confidential and not available to “any 
person except members of the Clemency Board and their staff.” 213 
Consequently, when an individual is denied clemency, he has no right to 
know why. Essentially all of the safeguards ensuring transparency and 
 
 206 See Maryland, CRIM. JUST. POL’Y FOUND., https://www.cjpf.org/clemency-md [https://perma.cc/ 
LX93-L8A5] (“The Maryland Secretary of State webpage does very little to explain the 
pardon/commutation application process, and confusingly suggests that the process starts at that office.”). 
 207  Maryland Parole Commission FAQs Index, DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR. SERVS., 
https://www.dpscs.state.md.us/about/FAQmpc.shtml [https://perma.cc/3GP8-RWWD] (“No petition for 
pardon shall be considered while the petitioner is incarcerated.”). 
 208 FLA. COMM’N ON OFFENDER REV., RULES OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY 3, https://www.fcor.state. 
fl.us/docs/clemency/clemency_rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/8E2F-2H3T]. 
 209 Id. 
 210 The clemency rules require completion of a sentence in order to apply for a pardon, which is 
impossible for those sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. at 6. 
 211  FLA. COMM’N ON OFFENDER REV., supra note 208, at 4–6. 
 212 The number of commutations granted in Florida is not available in any publicly available report. 
For all publicly available reports, see Reports/Publications, FLA. COMM’N ON OFFENDER REV., 
https://www.fcor.state.fl.us/reports.shtml [https://perma.cc/PJ6W-WPNS]. 
 213 FLA. COMM’N ON OFFENDER REV., supra note 208, at 18. 
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predictability that the ECtHR deemed essential when reviewing Bulgaria’s 
clemency process in Harakchiev are absent in Florida.214 
In contravention of the human rights standard laid out in Vinter 
requiring that there be preestablished criteria for release and review 
processes for life sentences known at the time of sentencing, there is no 
formal application for or guidelines governing the clemency process in 
Mississippi.215 There is also no constitutional requirement that a Governor 
respond to a clemency petition.216 Moreover, Phillip Bryant, the Mississippi 
Governor from 2012 to 2020, said that he would only grant commutation in 
the case of wrongful conviction, thereby cementing that release on the basis 
of rehabilitation would not be possible during his tenure.217 
The clemency process in North Carolina is also shrouded in secrecy. 
The process for applying and criteria for obtaining a commutation or pardon 
are completely opaque, with the government’s website dedicated to 
clemency devoid of any helpful guidance about the process.218 The only 
direction is provided by statute, which stipulates as follows: 
Every application for pardon must be made to the Governor in writing, signed 
by the party convicted, or by some person in his behalf. And every such 
application shall contain the grounds and reasons upon which the executive 
pardon is asked, and shall be in every case accompanied by a certified copy of 
the indictment, and the verdict and judgment of the court thereon.219 
In addition, the Governor is under no obligation to make any information 
concerning a denial of clemency public.220 It is thus completely unclear what 
grounds allow for release of someone serving an LWOP sentence in North 
Carolina. This, too, is out of line with past ECtHR jurisprudence, which 
concluded that a clemency process was deficient when the executive failed 
to give reasons for its decisions.221 
 
 214 See Harakchiev v. Bulgaria, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 391, 443. 
 215 AM. BAR ASS’N, CAPITAL CLEMENCY PROJECT, MISSISSIPPI CAPITAL CLEMENCY INFORMATION 
MEMORANDUM 3–4 (2017), https://www.capitalclemency.org/resource/mississippi-capital-clemency-
memo/ [https://perma.cc/3U3F-G5S6]. 
 216 Id. at 4. 
 217 Huma Khan, Pardon No More? Mississippi’s New Governor Eyes Tougher Rules for Clemency, 
ABC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2012), https://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/01/pardon-no-more-
mississippis-new-governor-eyes-tougher-rules-for-clemency [https://perma.cc/RV4T-KZ79]. 
 218 See Governor’s Clemency Office, N.C. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, https://www.ncdps.gov/adult-
corrections/governors-clemency-office [https://perma.cc/3YMW-G5QV]. 
 219 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 147-21 (2021). 
 220  AM. BAR ASS’N, CAPITAL CLEMENCY PROJECT, NORTH CAROLINA CAPITAL CLEMENCY 
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM 5 (2017), https://www.capitalclemency.org/file/nc_clemency_memo-
02_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/KSQ4-SD7P]. 
 221  See Hutchinson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 57592/08, ¶ 59 (Jan. 17, 2017), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170347 [https://perma.cc/TZ2Z-PX4U]. 
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The publicly available information about how to obtain either a pardon 
or a commutation in Nebraska is scant, and the criteria are unclear as well.222 
Additionally, clemency review has come to a near standstill since 2018.223 
The backlog of clemency petitions became so egregious that a bill was 
recently introduced that would force the Board of Pardons in Nebraska to 
review clemency applications every ninety days.224 
4. States with No Prospect of Release De Facto (Prospect of 
Release) 
In some states, clemency is so rarely granted that it is almost 
nonexistent, rendering such schemes problematic under human rights law 
because LWOP sentences are de facto irreducible.225 Being granted clemency 
in Arizona has been characterized as rarer than being struck by lightning, 
with commutation in particular being described as “all but dead.”226 Statistics 
support that characterization. From 2015 to 2018, the Governor of Arizona 
only granted one pardon and five commutations, all but one of which were 
for people facing imminent death who were released on compassionate 
grounds.227 Additionally, by law, those “sentenced to natural life” in Arizona 
will never be eligible for commutation, parole, work furlough, work release, 
or release from confinement on any basis.228 This means that obtaining a 
pardon, statistically an exceedingly rare prospect, is the only possible avenue 
for those sentenced to natural life.229 
 
 222 See Commutation of Sentence, STATE OF NE. BD. OF PARDONS, https://pardons.nebraska.gov/ 
commutation-sentence [https://perma.cc/3MCT-6NSC].  
 223 See RESTORATION OF RTS. PROJECT, supra note 127 (“Board processes appear to have come to a 
virtual standstill in 2018 after the retirement of a long-time staffer, but regular hearings may resume in 
2020.”). 
 224 JoAnne Young, Bill Would Force Nebraska Pardons Board to Meet and Consider Applications, 
LINCOLN J. STAR (Jan. 24, 2020), https://journalstar.com/legislature/bill-would-force-nebraska-pardons-
board-to-meet-and-consider-applications/article_a094f8d0-fd6e-5e94-9861-a9d5157d91f7.html [https:// 
perma.cc/CJ3T-X6FM]; Paul Hammel, Nebraska Pardons Board Met Only Twice Last Year, Denying 
People ‘A Fresh Start,’ Senators Told, OMAHA WORLD HERALD (Jan 27, 2020), https://omaha.com/state-
and-regional/nebraska-pardons-board-met-only-twice-last-year-denying-people-a-fresh-start-senators-
told/article_1c1e0fbe-fc5a-579a-81d0-af4a65f7bb02.html [https://perma.cc/K675-KD55]. 
 225 See Murray v. Netherlands, App. No. 10511/10, ¶ 100 (Apr. 26, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
fre?i=001-138893 [https://perma.cc/VGB6-EBVD] (“Finally, in assessing whether the life sentence is 
reducible de facto it may be of relevance to take account of statistical information on prior use of the 
review mechanism in question, including the number of persons having been granted a pardon.”). 
 226 Leingang, supra note 175. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Arizona law distinguishes between those subject to “natural life” and those to “life” who may at 
some point be eligible for release. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751 (2021) (“A defendant who is 
sentenced to natural life is not eligible for commutation, parole, work furlough, work release or release 
from confinement on any basis.”). 
 229 See id. §§ 13-751, 31-443. 
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In Connecticut, commutations of life sentences were once routine.230 
However, in 2007, the attorney general of Connecticut issued an opinion that 
reversed that trend.231 In response to a request from the state’s Board of 
Pardons for clarity about its authority to commute non-parole eligible 
offenses, the attorney general concluded that “[the] power to commute a 
parole ineligible sentence and transform it to a parole eligible sentence is 
barred by the express language of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-125a(b)(1).”232 
Essentially, commutations of LWOP sentences are unlawful according to 
this opinion. While not binding, the opinion is considered “highly 
persuasive,” and it is unclear if any LWOP sentences have been commuted 
since 2007.233  
Pardons are not available to those serving life sentences in Hawaii, 
leaving commutation as the only route to release.234 On a positive note, when 
an LWOP sentence is imposed, as a matter of course, the court directs the 
director of public safety and the Hawaii paroling authority to prepare an 
application for the Governor to commute that sentence to life imprisonment 
with parole at the end of twenty years of imprisonment, which is in line with 
the human rights standard on the time frame for review.235 However, in fiscal 
year 2019, the first year that the statistics on commutations were reported in 
Hawaii, not a single commutation was granted. 236  The following year, 
however, five commutations were granted.237 It is unclear how many of those 
were commutations of LWOP sentences. 
In Illinois, the Governor only approved two commutations in 2017, 
three in 2016, zero in 2015, and two in 2014. 238  Moreover, the state’s 
 
 230 NYU CTR. ON ADMIN. OF CRIM. L., STATE CLEMENCY PROJECT, SEARCHING FOR CLEMENCY IN 
THE CONSTITUTION STATE 5 (2020), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/CT_4_15_A%20CACL 
%20Clemency_Final%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EYM-NGAY]. 
 231 Id. at 5 n.42. 
 232 Id. at 5 (quoting Office of the Attorney General State of Connecticut, Opinion No. 2007-18, 
2007 WL 2800958 (Conn. A.G. Sept. 20, 2007)). 
 233 Id. at 5 & n.42. 
 234 See STATE OF HAW. EXEC. CHAMBERS, PARDON APPLICATION 1 (2018), https://dps.hawaii.gov/ 
wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Pardon-Application-.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QF2-67Y2]. 
 235 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-656 (2021). 
 236  HAW. PAROLING AUTH., 2019 ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT, FY 2019, JULY 1, 2018 TO  
JUNE 30, 2019, https://dps.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/2019-Annual-Report.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/9Q5X-CVFJ]. 
 237 HAW. PAROLING AUTHORITY, 2020 ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT, FY 2019, JULY 1, 2018 TO 
JUNE 30, 2020, https://dps.hawaii.gov/hpa/files/2020/10/2020-Annual-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
WR5Z-SBQZ]. 
 238 See STATE OF ILL., PRISONER REV. BD., 41ST ANNUAL REPORT, JANUARY 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 
2017, at 13, https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/prb/Documents/prb16anlrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CA4-
LAFF]; STATE OF ILL., PRISONER REV. BD., 40TH ANNUAL REPORT, JANUARY 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 2016, 
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statistical reports on clemency do not specify whether any of these were 
commutations of LWOP sentences. 239  In Massachusetts, only one 
commutation has been granted since 2000.240 More difficult still, as a matter 
of policy, commutations and pardons of those who are currently incarcerated 
are rarely granted.241 Likewise, the Minnesota Board of Pardons has granted 
only four pardons or commutations of active sentences since at least 1992, 
the first year that the state’s clemency statistics were publicly available.242 
This trend of scant clemency grants repeats in state after state across the 
United States. In Montana, from 2012 to 2017, the only years for which 
statistics are available, not a single commutation was granted, and those 
currently incarcerated are ineligible for a pardon.243 In New Hampshire, only 
three pardons and two sentence commutations have been granted since 
1996.244  Also, there are no standards of review.245  Rhode Island has not 
granted a pardon, the only form of clemency in the state, to a living person 
 
at 16, https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/prb/Documents/prb16anlrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5BN-KDTQ]; 
STATE OF ILL., PRISONER REV. BD., 39TH ANNUAL REPORT, JANUARY 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 2015, at 15, 
https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/prb/Documents/prb15anlrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/YKK7-GDNC]; STATE 
OF ILL., PRISONER REV. BD., 38TH ANNUAL REPORT, JANUARY 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 2014, at 15, 
https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/prb/Documents/FY14%20Annual%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
537H-9ZX7]. 
 239 The reports only list the number of commutations per year but does not specify the length of the 
sentences that were commuted. See sources cited supra note 238. 
 240 NYU CTR. ON ADMIN. OF CRIM. L., STATE CLEMENCY PROJECT, WILLIE HORTON’S SHADOW: 
CLEMENCY IN MASSACHUSETTS 3 (2019), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/CACL%20 
Clemency%20MA_Accessible.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQ26-QN84]. 
 241 Id. at 2–3; Memorandum from Charles D. Baker, Governor of Mass., Executive Clemency 
Guidelines 2 (Feb. 2, 2020), https://www.mass.gov/doc/executive-clemency-guidelines-2212020/ 
download [https://perma.cc/L5RL-NTMM]. 
 242  See Annual Reports, MN DEP’T OF CORR., https://mn.gov/doc/about/pardon-board/annual-
reports/ [https://perma.cc/J8W8-PMU4]. 
 243 See STATE OF MONT. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, STATISTICAL DATA FISCAL YEAR 2017, 
https://bopp.mt.gov/_docs/StatisticalData/2017FiscalYear.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY45-68CP]; STATE OF 
MONT. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, STATISTICAL DATA FISCAL YEAR 2016, https://bopp.mt.gov/_docs/ 
StatisticalData/2016FiscalYear.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FB2-G53U]; STATE OF MONT. BD. OF PARDONS & 
PAROLE, STATISTICAL DATA FISCAL YEAR 2015, https://bopp.mt.gov/_docs/StatisticalData/ 
2015FiscalYear.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS95-598P]; STATE OF MONT. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, 
STATISTICAL DATA FISCAL YEAR 2014, https://bopp.mt.gov/_docs/StatisticalData/2014FiscalYear.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C6N6-ERX6]; STATE OF MONT. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, STATISTICAL DATA 
FISCAL YEAR 2013, https://bopp.mt.gov/_docs/StatisticalData/2013FiscalYear.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
M356-5HUA]; STATE OF MONT. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, STATISTICAL DATA FISCAL YEAR 2012, 
https://bopp.mt.gov/_docs/StatisticalData/2012FiscalYear.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9BA-P2QK]. 
 244  N.H. Restoration of Rights & Record Relief, RESTORATION OF RTS. PROJECT, 
https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/new-hampshire-restoration-of-rights-pardon-
expungement-sealing/#II_Pardon_policy_practice [https://perma.cc/82D2-XS2G]. 
 245 Id. 
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in over a decade.246 There are also no eligibility requirements, and the process 
can change at the whim of the Governor.247 
5. States in Which Clemency Is Highly Unpredictable and Political 
(Criteria and Conditions for Release) 
In some states, whether clemency is granted, especially for those 
serving life sentences, is extremely dependent on who is in power, thereby 
rendering the process very unpredictable and variable. Alarmingly, this is the 
case in a number of states with a particularly high number of people serving 
LWOP sentences. One example of a state where clemency is very politicized 
is Pennsylvania, the state with the second largest population of people—
5,230—serving LWOP sentences. 248  As the website of the Pennsylvania 
Board of Pardons clarifies, those individuals “serving life sentences must 
apply for commutation of their life sentence as their only means of release 
since there is no such thing as parole for lifers in Pennsylvania.” 249  In 
Pennsylvania, over a period of nearly twenty years (1995 to 2014), there 
were only six commutations of life sentences.250 This is in part due to a state 
constitutional amendment in 1997 that required a unanimous vote from the 
Board of Pardons for any commutation of a life sentence.251 In addition, the 
clemency process is extremely political, since two of the five members of 
the Board of Pardons are elected officials (the attorney general and the 
Lieutenant Governor), and the Governor must approve every 
commutation. 252  Moreover, Republican governors in Pennsylvania are 
significantly less likely to grant a commutation of a life sentence than 
Democrats. Since 1995, only one commutation of a life sentence was granted 
 
 246 Rhode Island Restoration of Rights, Pardon, Expungement & Sealing, RESTORATION OF RTS. 
PROJECT, https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/rhode-island-restoration-of-rights-pardo 
n-expungement-sealing/ [https://perma.cc/PX7Y-Y7W5]. 
 247  Id.; 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-10-1 (2019) (stating that “any rules and regulations respecting 
[pardon application] filing and hearing that [the governor] may from time to time prescribe”). 
 248  See PA. DEP’T OF CORR., INMATE STATISTICS (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.cor.pa.gov/ 
About%20Us/Statistics/Documents/Budget%20Documents/2019%20Inmate%20Profile.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/LW9D-7E27]; PA. DEP’T OF CORR., ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPORT 2018, https://www.cor.pa. 
gov/About%20Us/Statistics/Documents/Reports/2018%20Annual%20Statistical%20Report.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/3TWY-M38L]. 
 249  Clemency Applications, PA. BD. OF PARDONS, https://www.bop.pa.gov/application-process/ 
Pages/clemency.aspx [https://perma.cc/X454-ZHEN]. 
 250 Commutation of Life Sentences (1971 - Present), PA. BD. OF PARDONS, https://www.bop.pa.gov/ 
Statistics/Pages/Commutation-of-Life-Sentences.aspx [https://perma.cc/ENK7-7JYJ]. 
 251 NYU CTR. ON ADMIN. OF CRIM. L., STATE CLEMENCY PROJECT, THE DEMISE OF CLEMENCY FOR 
LIFERS IN PENNSYLVANIA 9 (2020), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/CACL%20Clemency-
PA_Final%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7ZW-2752]. 
 252 Id. at 1 (“Among the five-member Board are the [publicly]-elected Attorney General and the 
Lieutenant Governor, whose presence undermines the political insulation normally associated with 
pardon boards.”). 
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by a Republican governor (despite there being three of them during this 
period).253 By comparison, the two Democratic governors granted forty-three 
commutations of life sentences, with thirty-eight being granted under 
Governor Tom Wolf.254 
Likewise, in Georgia, where 1,655 people are currently serving LWOP 
sentences, the efficacy of the clemency process seems to turn on who 
controls the Governor’s office.255 In Georgia, commutation is the only path 
to release for those individuals.256 Under Governor John Nathan Deal, in 
fiscal year 2017, 1,215 commutations were granted.257 In stark contrast, in 
fiscal year 2019, under Governor Brian Kemp, not a single commutation was 
approved.258 
6. States Without a Preestablished Time Frame for Review (Time 
Frame for Review) 
On a positive note, in accordance with human rights standards, most 
states allow for a clemency review sooner than twenty-five years after 
sentencing for those who are eligible for clemency.259 Missouri is an outlier 
in this respect. An individual currently incarcerated in Missouri can only 
apply for clemency if she has served more than twenty-five years, has an 
actual innocence claim, or is over seventy years old with at least twelve years 
served.260 There is also no guarantee of how long the clemency review will 
take or when it will commence after someone has applied.261 Consequently, 
 
 253  Commutation of Life Sentences (1971 - Present), supra note 250; Former Pennsylvania 
Governors, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, https://www.nga.org/former-governors/pennsylvania/ 
[https://perma.cc/7D6C-X9U2]. 
 254 Commutation of Life Sentences (1971 - Present), supra note 250. 
 255  DATA MGMT. SECTION, GA. DEP’T OF CORR., INMATE STATISTICAL PROFILE, ACTIVE LIFE 
WITHOUT PAROLE 4 (2020), http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/sites/all/themes/gdc/pdf/Profile_life_wo_ 
parole_2020_07.pdf [https://perma.cc/S68T-YD69]. 
 256 See GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 475-3-.10 (2015). 
 257 STATE BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLES, INFORMED, DATA DRIVEN PAROLE DECISIONS, ANNUAL 
REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 22, https://pap.georgia.gov/publications/annual-reports [https://perma.cc/ 
59XL-TJFN]. 
 258 STATE BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLES, PARTNERS IN PUBLIC SAFETY, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2019, 
at 25, https://pap.georgia.gov/publications/annual-reports [https://perma.cc/8F82-85TL]. 
 259 See chart discussed supra note 182. 
 260  STATE OF MO. DEP’T OF CORR., APPLICATION FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY, CONFINED 
APPLICANT (2020), https://doc.mo.gov/media/pdf/application-executive-clemency-confined-applicant 
[https://perma.cc/E33J-2A4D]. 
 261  See MO. DEP’T OF CORR., EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY, https://doc.mo.gov/divisions/probation-
parole/executive-clemency [https://perma.cc/699C-JBKJ] (“There is no set time frame for completion of 
the clemency process and Governor decision.”). 
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as of December 2019, there was a backlog of 3,500 clemency cases.262 Thus, 
many seeking clemency will not start the process until well after twenty-five 
years from their date of sentencing. In addition, in some states with life 
sentences with parole, parole review is only available after twenty-five years. 
For example, in Tennessee, those serving life sentences can only be eligible 
for parole after fifty-one years.263 
IV. HUMAN DIGNITY UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
Although the United States’ unwavering retributivist approach to life 
sentences is out of line with human rights standards and—as we will describe 
below—much of the rest of the world, our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
may offer an escape from unending damnation for over 160,000 among us 
sentenced to die in prison.264 Human dignity, a concept embedded in the 
scrutiny that the Eighth Amendment requires, unifies us with the global 
community, both figuratively and doctrinally.265 Vitally, Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence is dynamic and globally oriented in ways that other areas of 
the law are not. Whether punishment offends human dignity is evaluated in 
line with the evolving standards of decency and is, in part, understood by 
reference to the benchmarks set by the rest of the world. Herein lies the path 
to redeeming justice in the United States. 
A. Human Dignity as Fundamental to the Eighth Amendment 
Affirming that all people have the capacity for redemption is possible 
under the Eighth Amendment. As other legal scholars have recounted, there 
is a latent feature of the Eighth Amendment that could restore hope in the 
law: human dignity.266 Since human dignity is the foundation of the right to 
 
 262 Editorial, Gov. Mike Parson Is Sitting on a Backlog of 3,500 Clemency Cases. Why Won’t He 
Act?, KAN. CITY STAR, (Dec. 26, 2019, 11:27 AM), https://www.kansascity.com/opinion/editorials/ 
article238720168.html [https://perma.cc/A3XY-F289]. 
 263 Lichtenberg, supra note 13, at 42; see also Rahim Buford, Ashlee Sellers, Jeannie Alexander, 
Janet Wolf, Dawn Deaner & Josh Spickler, Opinion, Meaningful Life-Sentence Reform, Especially for 
Young Offenders, Needed, TENNESSEAN (Mar. 30, 2020), https://eu.tennessean.com/story/opinion/ 
2020/03/30/meaningful-life-sentence-reform-especially-young-offenders-needed/2929179001/ [https:// 
perma.cc/D6C2-KC3U] (“One of our most drastic sentencing changes came in 1995, when Tennessee 
doubled its life sentence, from a baseline of 25 years -- the current national average -- to a draconian 51 
years. With this extreme increase, a ‘life’ sentence in Tennessee essentially came to mean the same thing 
as life without parole. It meant death in prison and no second chances for anyone convicted of first-degree 
murder.”). 
 264 NELLIS, supra note 113, at 5. 
 265 Ryan, supra note 24, at 2140 (“The Court has said that dignity is the touchstone of the [Eighth] 
Amendment’s prohibition . . . .”). 
 266 E.g., id. at 2140–42.  
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redemption in other jurisdictions, it opens the door to a redemptive reading 
of the Eighth Amendment. 
Over the last four decades, dignity has featured prominently in the case 
law concerning cruel and unusual punishment, without much specificity 
about what it meant. A plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court first proclaimed 
in Trop v. Dulles that “[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment 
is nothing less than the dignity of man.”267 In Estelle v. Gamble, the Eighth 
Amendment was said to embody the “broad and idealistic concepts of 
dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.”268 Roper v. Simmons 
affirmed that “[b]y protecting even those convicted of heinous crimes, the 
Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the 
dignity of all persons.”269 In so holding, the Court has aimed “to protect the 
dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless 
vengeance.”270 
In these cases, the Court portrays dignity as the central concept that 
underlies all Eighth Amendment inquiries, rather than as a set of legal 
requirements to satisfy. Taking the Supreme Court at its word, dignity could 
be used as an interpretive principle from which we could derive a set of 
corresponding duties or protections, to thereby help courts adjudicate Eighth 
Amendment claims. 271  This might be counterintuitive, since the U.S. 
Constitution does not explicitly reference dignity amongst its provisions. 
However, dignity remains a core principle of the U.S. Constitution, with the 
U.S. Supreme Court reading dignity into the Constitution nearly a thousand 
times.272 As Justice William Brennan Jr. underscored, “the constitutional 
ideal of human dignity” is the foundation of U.S. law.273 
Despite dignity’s omnipresence in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, 
its content remains murky, confounding legal scholars and practitioners 
alike. So much so that scholars have come to widely divergent 
understandings of what dignity in the Eighth Amendment context provides, 
with some taking a very communitarian view of it and others a much more 
 
 267 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 268 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)). 
 269 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005). 
 270 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986). 
 271 Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 655, 681 (2008). 
 272 Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 172–73, 178 (2011); 
see also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 455 (1793) (“A State; useful and valuable as the 
contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of man; and from his native dignity derives all its acquired 
importance.”). 
 273 Henry, supra note 272, at 171. 
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individualistic one. 274  For instance, Professor Leslie Meltzer Henry 
characterized the strand of dignity in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as an 
effort to protect the “collective virtue” of the human species.275 In Professor 
Henry’s reading of this line of cases, inhumane punishment is prohibited 
because it would degrade “the totality of human life.”276 On the other end of 
the spectrum, after a more holistic review of Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, including cases that do not explicitly reference dignity, 
Professor Meghan Ryan linked dignity to the individualism of the 
offender.277 Professor Ryan ties individualism to two facets of the Eighth 
Amendment analysis—the humanness facet and the proportionality facet.278 
The humanness facet prohibits punishments that are so extreme and 
horrendous that no human being, regardless of his crime, should be subjected 
to them.279 The proportionality facet, on the other hand, mandates that the 
offender should not receive greater punishment than he deserves.280 In other 
words, the punishment must be proportionate to the crime. 
These studies share an inductive approach to dignity, relying on the 
judicial discourse in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to discern dignity’s 
content. There are several limitations to exclusively employing this approach 
to understanding dignity’s role in the Eighth Amendment. First, as openly 
acknowledged by several legal scholars, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
is “a mess.”281 Compounding that uncertainty is the lack of clarity generally 
about the meaning of human dignity and its implications for U.S. 
 
 274 Compare McCrudden, supra note 271, at 699 (concluding that “the predominant approach to 
dignity in the US Supreme Court . . . is more individualistic”), and Ryan, supra note 24, at 2132 (finding 
“that Eighth Amendment dignity means the individuality of an offender must be respected”), with Henry, 
supra note 272, at 220–29 (describing “the collective virtue of humanity” as “less concerned with 
individual dignity per se than with how a society values the totality of human life” and linking this 
conception of dignity to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 275 Henry, supra note 272, at 220–29. 
 276 Id. at 221. 
 277 Ryan, supra note 24, at 2132. 
 278 Id. at 2132, 2144 (“One facet of this concentration on the individual is that the offender should 
not receive greater punishment than he deserves. Punishment for some other reason—such as to further 
society in some way—loses sight of the individual. The other facet of the focus on the individual is 
emphasizing the fact that the individual is a human being. There are some punishments that are so 
inhumane, so uncivilized, that no one should be punished in that manner—not even humans who have 
committed the vilest of offenses.”). 
 279 Id. at 2132–33, 2146.  
 280 Id. at 2144. 
 281 Id. at 2131; see also Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 773 (2005) (“[T]he Court’s analysis of human dignity in most death 
penalty cases is weak and meaningless.”); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive 
Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 681 (2005) (describing the Eighth Amendment proportionality test as 
“messy and complex, yet largely meaningless as a constraint” (citation omitted)). 
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constitutional law.282 Moreover, from the case law alone, it is difficult to 
draw out how dignity relates to the standards developed by the Court, hence 
the wildly divergent characterization of the norm by legal scholars who have 
looked closely at this jurisprudence. Quite plainly, the existing case law does 
little to suggest how dignity is connected to the Eighth Amendment common 
law standards, stagnating further development of this jurisprudence. 
Paradoxically, the case law seems to call for further expansion. 283 
Indeed, the Court has specified that both facets of human dignity described 
by Professor Ryan are just the minimum of what dignity requires. For 
example, Gregg, a case she uses as an illustration of the proportionality 
facet,284 specifies that for a punishment to accord with human dignity, it 
“means, at least, that the punishment not be ‘excessive.’”285 To that end, at a 
bare minimum, a punishment must be proportionate to the offense, but 
dignity also demands more. Likewise, in Ford, a case linked to the 
humanness facet, 286  the Court concluded that “the Eighth Amendment’s 
proscriptions are not limited to those practices condemned by the common 
law in 1789.”287 In other words, these prohibitions are the floor, not the 
ceiling, of what dignity requires. Thus, looking at the existing case law alone 
does not illuminate the full scope of the norm and what it was meant to 
protect. The Court has explicitly said as much: “To enforce the 
Constitution’s protection of human dignity,” the Court must “look[] to the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society,” 288  thereby recognizing that “[t]he Eighth Amendment is not 
fastened to the obsolete.” 289  Inherently, understanding dignity requires a 
more profound inquisition. 
 
 282 As underscored by Professor Darren Hutchinson, dignity’s ambiguity and indeterminacy has also 
enabled conservative justices to use it to promote conservative perspectives on race and racism, like 
colorblind constitutionalism. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Undignified: The Supreme Court, Racial 
Justice, and Dignity Claims, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1, 26, 29–30, 61 (2017). 
 283 Goodman, supra note 281, at 778 (“The Eighth Amendment jurisprudence demonstrates the need 
for the Court to develop a test or standard for consistent decision-making with regard to human dignity.”). 
 284 Ryan, supra note 24, at 2147–48. 
 285 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). The Court 
mentioned two instances when a punishment is excessive: (1) when it inflicts unnecessary and wanton 
pain and (2) when it is out of proportion with the offense. Id. 
 286 Ryan, supra note 24, at 2150. 
 287 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (emphasis added). 
 288 Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 708 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
 289 Id. at 708 (quotation marks omitted). But compare Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019), 
a recent Eighth Amendment decision in which the Court failed to analyze (or even mention) the evolving 
standards of decency when evaluating the constitutionality of Missouri’s method of lethal injection. 
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B. Reading Human Rights into the Evolving Standards of Decency 
Specifically, evaluating whether punishment is indecent290 in the current 
age necessitates assessing “contemporary values concerning the infliction of 
a challenged sanction.”291 Such an assessment requires that courts examine 
the “objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction” 
as a means of avoiding the transposition of a judge’s ideology into this 
analysis.292 In the past, the U.S. Supreme Court has often looked to the laws 
and practices of international and foreign jurisdictions as persuasive 
authority when conducting such inquiries. 293  As the Court explained in 
Graham v. Florida, there is a “longstanding practice in noting the global 
consensus against the sentencing practice in question.”294  The “laws and 
practices of other nations and international agreements” are thus instructive 
when interpreting the Eighth Amendment.295 State courts have followed suit, 
looking to comparative and international law sources when reviewing 
challenges to the constitutionality of punishment, either under the Eighth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution or the analogous provision under their 
state constitutions.296 
Courts may thus look to other jurisdictions with more robust accounts 
of human dignity in their jurisprudence when conducting their Eighth 
 
 290 The Court uses both the terms dignity and decency in its Eighth Amendment case law. However, 
the court evokes “evolving standards of decency” as a legal standard and “dignity” as an underlying 
rationale for the Eighth Amendment. Hall, 572 U.S. at 708.  
 291 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
 292 Id. 
 293 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (“[A]t least from the time of the Court’s decision 
in Trop, the Court has referred to the laws of other countries and to international authorities as instructive 
for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”); see 
also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (“[W]ithin the world community, the imposition 
of the death penalty for crimes committed by [intellectually disabled] offenders is overwhelmingly 
disapproved.”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (“The civilized nations of the world are in virtual 
unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime.”). For a comprehensive review 
of the citations of international and foreign sources in U.S. Supreme Court decisions, see Sarah H. 
Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2–3 (2006). The citation of 
international and comparative sources in U.S. case law has also not been without its criticism. See, e.g., 
Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57 
(2004); Youngjae Lee, International Consensus as Persuasive Authority in the Eighth Amendment, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 63 (2007). Justice Antonin Scalia, for example, was a notable critic of the practice. 
Roper, 543 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“More fundamentally, however, the basic premise of the 
Court’s argument—that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world—ought to be 
rejected out of hand.”). 
 294 560 U.S. 48, 80 (2010). 
 295 Id. at 82. 
 296 MARTHA F. DAVIS, JOHANNA KALB & RISA E. KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 278 (2d ed. 2018). For a comprehensive survey of state courts looking to international 
human rights law to inform their decision-making, see OPPORTUNITY AGENDA & PHRGE, HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN STATE COURTS (2014). 
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Amendment analysis. And human rights law is a natural source.297 Just as 
human dignity is the foundational concept in Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, it is also one of the fundamental justifications for human 
rights law.298 As Eleanor Roosevelt explained, human dignity was included 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “in order to emphasize that 
every human being is worthy of respect . . . [and] was meant to explain why 
human beings have rights to begin with.” 299  That is not to say that the 
theoretical meaning of human dignity is well settled by any means—quite 
the contrary.300 In the past, however, such agreement was not needed for 
states to agree on common legal commitments grounded in human dignity.301 
Rather, by taking a human rights pragmatist’s approach to the Eighth 
Amendment, we can deduce through an examination of human dignity’s 
robust jurisprudence in other jurisdictions whether there is consensus about 
its implications.302 A human rights pragmatist derives the meaning of dignity 
not from theory, but from its use in practice.303 Using this approach, we 
cannot glean the meaning of human dignity from what any single judge says. 
Instead, in order to be incorporated into the public meaning of the phrase, it 
must be “taken up by the relevant communities of discourse” in the 
international community.304 One of the advantages of using this approach is 
that, as Professor Christopher McCrudden points out, “different jurisdictions 
share a sense of what dignity requires, and this enables a dialogue to take 
place between judges on the interpretation of human rights norms, based on 
a supposedly shared assumption.”305 
 
 297 Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry into 
Criteria and Content, 27 HOWARD L.J. 145, 213–14 (1984). 
 298 David Luban, Human Rights Pragmatism and Human Dignity: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry 
into Criteria and Content, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 263, 274 (Rowan Cruft, 
S. Matthew Liao & Massimo Renzo eds., 2015). This also corresponds to Professor Jeremy Waldron’s 
theory of ius gentium. See Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 129, 138 (2005) (characterizing ius gentium as a site of “the accumulated wisdom of the world on 
rights and justice”). 
 299 McCrudden, supra note 271, at 677. 
 300 Luban, supra note 298, at 275; see also JEREMY WALDRON & MEIR DAN-COHEN, DIGNITY, 
RANK, AND RIGHTS 15 (2012) (“There does not seem to be any canonical definition of ‘dignity’ in the 
law.”). 
 301 JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING, 
AND INTENT 284–302 (1999). 
 302 See Luban, supra note 298, at 275–76. 
 303 Id. at 275. In general, pragmatism is grounded in the “notion that ideas and concepts, including 
legal ones, are inherently ‘social’ and accordingly dependent on the human environment and culture in 
which they are produced and thrive.” ANDREA BIANCHI, INTERNATIONAL LAW THEORIES 92 (2016). 
 304 Luban, supra note 298, at 275. 
 305 McCrudden, supra note 271, at 695. 
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The human rights pragmatist approach to human dignity is quite 
instructive for Eighth Amendment analyses in particular. First, the approach 
accords with the U.S. Supreme Court’s evaluation of “evolving standards of 
decency,” which counsels courts to look at global trends as objective indicia 
of what human dignity requires. 306  In line with this jurisprudence, other 
conceptions of human dignity—and in particular as they relate to cruel and 
unusual punishment—could very well inform the bounds that this country 
places on punishment. Second, the concept of human dignity is intrinsically 
linked to prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment. 307  As Professor 
Jeremy Waldon explains, prohibitions on degrading treatment are closely 
tied to human dignity in that “they address the most direct and alarming ways 
in which human dignity might be assaulted—for example, conscious 
attempts to treat people as having a sub-human status.”308 Third, as was 
discussed in Part II and will be fleshed out further below, the judicial 
discourse connecting human dignity with cruel and usual punishment is quite 
robust.309 Indeed, human rights and constitutional courts around the world 
frequently invoke human dignity when determining the meaning and scope 
of the prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment. 310  This extensive 
jurisprudence makes the pragmatist approach particularly pertinent and 
useful. 
C. The Global Trend Towards the Right to Redemption 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretations of Eighth Amendment 
prohibitions are not immutable and must be understood in line with evolving 
standards of decency—sometimes informed by worldwide trends—looking 
to human rights jurisprudence and comparative constitutional law can help 
us to see more clearly what human dignity requires. Indeed, globally, there 
is a growing consensus that LWOP sentences that lack any possibility of 
review and release are cruel and unusual. There is also an increased emphasis 
on the rehabilitative ideal. These global trends, taken together with the 
human rights law described in Part II, could inform more robust protections 
against inhuman and degrading punishment in the United States. Therefore, 
the jurisprudence described below represents more than just the opinions of 
far-flung jurisdictions—the decisions are the antecedents for building a 
justice that respects human dignity and enables redemption in this country. 
 
 306 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005). 
 307 McCrudden, supra note 271, at 685–88. 
 308 Jeremy Waldron, Is Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights?, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 298, at 117, 119. 
 309 See McCrudden, supra note 271, at 695–96. 
 310 Id. at 686–88. 
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1. The Right to Redemption in Europe 
As the ECtHR pointed out in Vinter, “a large majority of Contracting 
States either do not impose life sentences at all or, if they do impose life 
sentences, provide some dedicated mechanism, integrated within the 
sentencing legislation, guaranteeing a review of those life sentences after a 
set period, usually after twenty-five years imprisonment.”311 Indeed, only ten 
European countries permit LWOP sentences.312 
In Europe, Germany has been the standard-bearer for the right to 
redemption.313 In 1977, the German Constitutional Court became one of the 
first courts in the world to declare life sentences that preclude any possibility 
of ever regaining freedom as unconstitutional.314 The court found that if there 
is no hope of release, then a life sentence is at odds with the principle of 
human dignity enshrined in the German constitution, which is the highest 
legal value in its constitutional order. 315  Harkening back to an earlier 
decision, the court connected human dignity to the right to the free 
development of one’s personality, concluding that everyone should enjoy a 
sphere of autonomy in which they can shape her private life by developing 
and protecting her individuality.316 Consequently, in the words of the court, 
 
 311 Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 317, 348. The Vinter court relied heavily on 
this trend among contracting states when concluding that a right to redemption existed in human rights 
law. Id. 
 312 Berry, supra note 36, at 1075 n.206. (“These countries are Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.”). 
 313 Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 96 (2011) (“Probably 
the most important and influential nation to give a real substance to its dignity jurisprudence is 
Germany.”); DIRK VAN ZYL SMIT & CATHERINE APPLETON, LIFE IMPRISONMENT: A GLOBAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS ANALYSIS 237 (2019). 
 314 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court], 45 BVerfGE 187, June 21, 
1977 (Ger.) [hereinafter Judgment of June 21, 1977], translation at http://www.hrcr.org/safrica/ 
dignity/45bverfge187.html [https://perma.cc/EGQ2-BH7A] (“The assessment of the constitutionality of 
lifetime imprisonment especially with references to Article 1.1. of the Basic Law and the principle of the 
rule of law (Rechtsstaatsprinzip) revealed that a humane execution of the lifetime imprisonment can only 
be assured if the sentenced criminal has a concrete and principally attainable possibility to regain freedom 
at a later point in time; for the core of human dignity is struck if the convicted criminal has to give up any 
hope of regaining his freedom no matter how his personality develops.”). 
 315 Id. Specifically, Article 1, § 1 of the German constitution, called the Basic Law, states, “Human 
dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all public authority.” Grundgesetz 
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“[i]t would be inconsistent with human dignity . . . if the state were to claim 
the right to forcefully strip a human of his freedom without [the human] 
having at least the possibility to ever regain freedom.”317 Echoing a Kantian 
understanding of human dignity, the court explained that the “offender may 
not be turned into a mere object of [the state’s] fight against crime under 
violation of his constitutionally protected right to social worth and 
respect.”318 
In arriving at this decision, the court derived the notion of 
Behandlungsvollzug, which is comparable to the principle of rehabilitation, 
from the principle of human dignity.319 Since Germany is a “social state,” the 
court concluded that the state had a duty to foster rehabilitation and 
reintegration, which should be a primary purpose of imprisonment, even for 
those serving life sentences.320 For that reason, correctional facilities need to 
do their utmost “to offset damaging consequences caused by the loss of 
freedom and thereby especially counter all deforming alterations of 
personality.” 321  As the ECtHR concluded in Vinter, the German 
Constitutional Court concluded that the state’s duty corresponded with 
certain rights of the individual who is being detained. More precisely, all 
detained people have a “right to be prepared to reenter the society, even if he 
will only after a long period of atonement for his crime have the possibility 
to be obliged to handle a life in freedom.”322 It would run counter to human 
dignity, the court concluded, if a human being never had the possibility or 
hope of regaining freedom again, no matter the changes he made in his life.323 
In its opinion, the German Constitutional Court went further still, 
reading Behandlungsvollzug together with Rechtsstaat, or the principle of 
legal certainty, to require a clear procedure and conditions for release to be 
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spelled out in national legislation.324 The court also required that review be 
made by the judiciary.325 As a consequence, the prospect of release must be 
guaranteed through means other than an executive pardon.326 This opinion by 
the court shifted the procedure from reliance on executive pardon power to 
reliance on judicial review of release.327 In response to this decision, the 
German legislature added a paragraph to the criminal code, requiring release 
if: (1) fifteen years of the sentence had been served, (2) the degree of the 
convicted person’s guilt no longer required continued detention, 
(3) suspension was justified under the security interests of the general public, 
and (4) the imprisoned person agreed.328 
2. The Right to Redemption in Latin America 
Europe is not alone. Because so few countries in Latin America employ 
life sentences, Latin America has been referred to as a “life imprisonment 
almost-free zone.”329  Part of the reason for the region’s aversion to life 
sentences is that nearly all Latin American countries take a rehabilitative 
approach to punishment.330 For many years in Latin America, life sentences 
only existed in six countries: Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Honduras, Mexico 
(legal only in five of its thirty-two states), and Peru.331 In 2020, the region 
added a seventh country when Colombia made certain crimes against 
children punishable by life imprisonment.332 
Even in those Latin American countries that permit life sentences, there 
generally still exists a possibility of review and release, such that life 
sentences are not unalterable. In Chile and Honduras, for example, all life 
sentences have a possibility of parole and are thus reviewable and 
reducible.333 Of those seven countries that permit life sentences, only four 
permit LWOP sentences (Argentina, Cuba, Peru, and four states in 
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Mexico).334 As in many European countries, life sentences, including LWOP 
sentences, that forbore the prospect of release have been found to be cruel 
and unusual.335 The incompatibility of life imprisonment with human dignity 
has been at the center of these determinations.336 In Peru, for instance, the 
Constitutional Court held that life sentences are only constitutional insofar 
as they provide a judicial mechanism for review and release; otherwise, they 
undermine dignity and fail to account for rehabilitation.337 In short, “the 
offender must have the possibility of returning to society.”338 In Argentina, 
the Supreme Court of Justice ruled in 2006 that life sentences that lack a 
judicial mechanism for release are unconstitutional because they seriously 
damage “the intangibility of the human being.”339 In only two countries, 
Cuba and Mexico (specifically, only three Mexican states), is a life sentence 
without parole the only option for life sentences.340 
The understanding of resocialization as the aim of punishment derives 
from the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), one of the 
principal treaties that undergirds the Inter-American system of human 
rights.341 Article 5.6 of the ACHR provides that “[p]unishments consisting of 
deprivation of liberty shall have as an essential aim the reform and social 
readaptation of the prisoners.”342 In a case addressing juvenile life without 
parole (JLWOP), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights further 
affirmed that the “fundamental goal [of punishment] is to prepare 
[individuals] to rejoin society, which means that sentences of incarceration 
must focus on ensuring that persons sentenced to prison are willing and able 
to conduct themselves as law-abiding members of society.”343 The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights has also weighed in, finding that states 
 
 334 Lorca, supra note 330, at 52. 
 335 Id. at 54–62. 
 336 Id. at 54. 
 337 Id. at 61. 
 338 Id. 
 339 Id. at 56. 
 340 Id. at 52. 
 341 Villalba, supra note 329, at 19–20. For an explanation of why the United States does not abide 
by the decisions of the Inter-American Commission and Court to the same degree as most Latin American 
countries, see generally Francisco J. Rivera Juaristi, U.S. Exceptionalism and the Strengthening Process 
of the Inter-American Human Rights System, 20 HUM. RTS BRIEF 19 (2013), https://www.corteidh.or.cr/ 
tablas/r30736.pdf [https://perma.cc/HLR4-H6FW]. 
 342 Pact of San José, Costa Rica, American Convention on Human Rights art. 5.6, Nov. 22, 1969, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143. The United States has also signed the American Convention on 
Human Rights and accordingly must not undermine the object and purpose of the treaty.  
 343 Mendoza v. Argentina, Case 12.561, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 172/10, ¶ 140 (2010). 
For background information about the role of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as well 
as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, see “Inter-American Human Rights System,” INT’L JUST. 
RESOURCE CTR., https://ijrcenter.org/regional/inter-american-system/ [https://perma.cc/L483-5MWT]. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
378 
have a special responsibility to ensure that people deprived of their liberty 
have the conditions necessary to live with dignity and can enjoy their other 
human rights to the fullest extent possible under the circumstances.344 
The Resolution on Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of 
Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas, which is nonbinding but is 
meant to guide states, also reflects the resocialization ideal of punishment.345 
The principles are based on the concept that “punishments consisting of 
deprivation of liberty shall have as an essential aim the reform, social 
readaptation and personal rehabilitation of those convicted; the reintegration 
into society and family life; as well as the protection of both the victims and 
society.”346 
Since most Latin American states joined the Inter-American Human 
Rights System at the same time as they transitioned to democracy, these 
human rights principles became codified in their newly drafted 
constitutions. 347  Consequently, the resocialization principle, essentially 
another framing of the rehabilitative ideal that undergirds the right to 
redemption, remains enshrined in many constitutions in Latin America.348 
For example, the Brazilian Constitution of 1934 expressly banned life 
imprisonment, providing that “[t]here shall be no penalty of banishment, 
death, confiscation or of a perpetual character.”349 
3. The Right to Redemption in Africa 
Numerous jurisdictions in Africa have also found life sentences without 
the possibility of parole to be cruel and unusual. For instance, in State v. 
Tcoeib, the Supreme Court of Namibia declared that a sentence should never 
be imposed if it “effectively amounts to a sentence which locks the gates of 
the prison irreversibly for the offender without any prospect whatever of any 
lawful escape from that condition for the rest of his or her natural life and 
regardless of any circumstances which might subsequently arise.”350 The 
court thus considered a life sentence without the possibility of release to be 
unconstitutional but concluded that the release scheme in Namibia was 
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lawful because release was possible for those serving a life sentence.351 For 
example, the court noted that, under the Prisons Act of 1959, the president 
had the power to release any person “serving any period of imprisonment” 
on probation or parole regardless of whether parole was foreseen at the time 
of sentencing.352 
In Angola, all life sentences are considered unlawful, because the 
Angolan constitution explicitly provides that “[n]o sentence or security 
measure that deprives or restricts freedom shall be perpetual in nature or of 
an unlimited or undefined duration.”353 In Angola, no one can be incarcerated 
for more than thirty years, regardless of age. 354  Life imprisonment or 
imprisonment of unlimited or indefinite duration is also explicitly prohibited 
by the constitution of Cape Verde.355 Moreover, in Mozambique, based on 
Article 61 of the Mozambique constitution, penalties and security measures 
that deprive or restrict freedom in perpetuity or for an unlimited or indefinite 
time are also prohibited.356 
In South Africa, although life sentences are constitutional, the South 
African Constitutional Court has specified that any “attempt to justify any 
period of penal incarceration, let alone imprisonment for life . . . , without 
inquiring into the proportionality between the offence and the period of 
imprisonment, is to ignore, if not to deny, that which lies at the very heart of 
human dignity.”357 In other decisions, the South African Constitutional Court 
has connected human dignity to ubuntu, a native African concept that also 
informed the R2R Committee’s conceptualization of the right to 
redemption. 358  The court explains that “[g]enerally, ubuntu translates as 
humaneness.”359 The concept is grounded in the collective recognition of 
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group solidarity and the interdependence of the members of a community.360 
It turns on the coexistence of the rights and duties of the individual alongside 
the communitarian rights of duties of society.361 The court has concluded that 
“[t]reatment that is cruel, inhuman or degrading is bereft of ubuntu.”362 
D. A Redemptive Reading of the Eighth Amendment 
Taken together with the human rights law described in Part II, this 
comparative constitutional law provides the legal basis for redeeming justice 
in the United States. Through a human rights pragmatist approach to human 
dignity, reading the right to redemption into Eighth Amendment evaluations 
of cruel and usual punishment is conceivable. As Professor David Luban 
explained, a human rights pragmatist—looking to the case law holding that 
LWOP violates human dignity—would make a material inference from the 
features that distinguish LWOP from other life sentences, namely the 
impossibility of review and release, to understand what human dignity 
requires.363 At a minimum, this approach would lead us to the conclusion that 
LWOP infringes on human dignity because the sentence “presumes that 
atonement and development of the [individual]’s personality are 
impossible.”364 Read in this light, the global “trend towards placing more 
emphasis on rehabilitation” is quite consequential.365 The fact that the United 
States is one of the rare countries that employs LWOP—with no escape valve 
whatsoever—should raise considerable concerns about its habitual use.366 
Like most jurisdictions across the globe that consider life sentences with no 
mechanism for review and release to be cruel and unusual, the state courts 
and legislatures in the United States should adopt the redemptive principles 
described above to ensure a possibility of review and prospect of release to 
forestall DBI.367 In particular in cases involving juveniles, states have broad 
discretion to adopt review mechanisms that comport with the right to 
redemption in light of Jones v. Mississippi, which specified that the Court’s 
decision did not “preclude the States from imposing additional sentencing 
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limits in cases involving defendants under 18 convicted of murder . . . 
[including] substantive appellate review of life-without-parole sentences.”368  
As a baseline, a redemptive reading of the Eighth Amendment would 
incorporate the progression principle described in Part II. Instead of 
penological justifications being frozen in time, sentences would need to be 
reviewed regularly to assess the evolving justifications for confinement. In 
line with the margin of appreciation granted to states under international 
human rights law, the review could take a number of forms, including parole 
or clemency.  
Regardless of the form, any review process must follow the same 
human rights standards set out in Part III. First, the process must include a 
level of legal certainty such that those serving life sentences know what they 
must do to be considered for release. To accomplish this, the process must 
be transparent, follow clearly established criteria, and not be arbitrary. In the 
context of clemency, this means that the executive branch’s discretion to 
grant or deny release cannot be unfettered. Second, the process must provide 
a realistic possibility of release based on rehabilitation.369 In other words, it 
cannot be a review in name only; it must be meaningful. This understanding 
accords with the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Graham, which 
stipulated that “[a] State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a 
juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime . . . [but must] give 
defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release 
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” 370  Guaranteeing a 
human right to redemption extends this opportunity to all people, not just 
juveniles who have committed nonhomicide crimes. Third, the review must 
be regular, to ensure that sentences do not become excessive the longer they 
endure. If penological justifications are lacking, then under the Eighth 
Amendment, release would be required. At its essence, the progression 
principle under human rights law mandates that the state revisit life sentences 
to ensure that the initial reason for punishment still holds and that the 
sentence should not be altered due to the individual’s rehabilitation. When 
there is no way to reconsider a sentence in light of the changed circumstances 
of the individual, punishment becomes cruel and unusual. 
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CONCLUSION 
As calls to reimagine the U.S. criminal legal system abound, the 
concepts and principles discussed in this Article are timelier than ever. Many 
yearn for a justice that facilitates healing and human development, rather 
than employs incarceration as the solution to all societal harms. A criminal 
legal system driven by vengeance, stereotypes, and oversimplification of the 
human condition will not suffice. Restructuring it will require adopting legal 
principles to guide visions of a more just society and a legal system to match. 
The right to redemption outlined here provides one blueprint for 
escaping our carceral default. We have started with DBI, but that is just the 
beginning. Redemptive justice stretches much further. Accepting the 
principle that all people have the capacity to evolve and change has far-
reaching implications. It will require recognition of redeeming stories, like 
ours, which too often go untold. It will require a searching justice that 
restores hope and upholds human dignity. Fundamentally, redemptive justice 
holds space for complexity, invests in human potential, and replaces shallow 
vindication with deeply rooted healing. 
